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RESERVED INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IN RIPARIAN
JURISDICTIONS: WATER, WATER
EVERYWHERE, PERHAPS SOME
DROPS FOR US
Hope M. Babcockt

In this Article, the author explores the question of whether nonfederally
recognized eastern Indian tribes can claim reserved tribal rights to water
under the Winters doctrine. The urgency of resolving this question in the
tribes'favor is underscored by the mounting problem of water scarcity in the
East, where most such tribes live, and the problems these tribes have in claiming water under the prevailing systems for managing water in that part of
the country, riparianismand regulated riparianism. Recognizing that, to
date, these rights have been claimed almost exclusively by federally recognized
western tribes who live on withdrawn federal lands in states that manage
water under the prior appropriationsystem, the author nonethelessputs forth
an array of reasons why these factors should not bar eastern tribes from
claiming the same rights. After examining the major features of the three
systems for allocatingsurfaceflow and the Winters doctrine, the author will
show that there are no insurmountable obstacles to the assertion ofWinters
rights in non-prior appropriationjurisdictions. The author then turns to
various normative and utilitarianreasons why eastern tribes should be able
to claim these rights. The Article concludes by showing why the artifacts of
federal recognition and federal reservations should not pose a barrierto eastern tribes' assertion of their Winters rights.
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INTRODUCTION

There has been a lot said about the sacredness of our land which is our body;
and the values of our culture which is our soul; but water is the blood of our
tribes, and ifits life-giving flow is stopped, or it is polluted, all else will die
and the many thousands of years of our communal existence will come to an
end.1

Since the 1980s, recurrent patterns of drought and population
growth have increased the demand on eastern rivers. 2 This, in turn,
1
A Dwindling Water Supply and the Indian Struggle to Retain Aboriginal and Winters Doctrine Water Rights, AM. INDIAN J., Dec. 1978, at 35 (quoting Governor Frank Tenorio of the
San Felipe Pueblo).
2 See Olivia S. Choe, Note, Appurtenancy Reconceptualized: Managing Water in an Era of
Scarcity, 113 YALE L.J. 1909, 1909 (2004) (stating that in the past few decades, "water has
increasingly become scarce, due to recurring droughts and burgeoning urban and suburban populations"); see also The Twenty-First Century Water Commission Act of 2003: Notice for
Hearingon H.R.135 Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources and Environment of the H. Comm. on
Transportation and Infrastructure, 108th Cong. (scheduled for May 7, 2003), available at
http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/05-07-03/05-07-3memo.html (discussing
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has put stress on the capacity of the traditional legal regime, the common law riparian doctrine, to allocate flow equitably and efficiently
among potential users and to preserve sufficient water for ecosystem
purposes. 3 In response to increasing consumption of surface water
and the unanticipated problem of potential overconsumption, many
eastern states have modified the common law riparian doctrine by incorporating features of the western appropriation doctrine, a legal regime designed for a significantly drier climate with historic water
4
scarcity.
Regulators have generally overlooked eastern Indian tribes 5 when
deciding who receives access to surface water. 6 This remains true despite the fact that many eastern tribes occupy reservations adjacent to
rivers and depend on the water in those rivers for food and income, as
well as for cultural identity and ceremonial purposes. 7 As the demands on surface water increase in the East, these tribes, similar to
tribes in the West, find themselves competing with powerful non-Indian interests for an increasingly scarce resource. 8 Eastern tribes are,
however, at a distinct disadvantage compared with many western
tribes because the legal regimes within which eastern tribes seek access to water are generally unfavorable to their claims.
One way to level the playing field for eastern tribes is to recognize
that like federally recognized western tribes, tribes in the East possess
a reserved water right, known as a Winters right, to sustain their treatyprotected aboriginal uses of the water that flows across or next to their

H.R. 135's establishment of a commission to conduct an assessment of the United States'
water resources in light of recent water scarcity in the East); SANDRA POSTEL & BRIAN
RICHTER, RnVERS FOR LIFE: MANAGING WATER FOR PEOPLE AND NATURE 93 (2003) (stating
that many eastern rivers, like those in the West, are "oversubscribed, leaving little or no
flow to meet ecosystem requirements"); Richard Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in theEast:
A Programfor Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547, 547 (1983) (attributing water shortages in
the East to "expanding municipal and industrial demand" and "increasing use of supplemental irrigation").
3
See Choe, supra note 2, at 1911-12.
4
See id. at 1912.
5 Western tribes have not been similarly ignored, because of the significant "paper
rights" to water they possess by virtue of the so-called Winters doctrine. SeeJudith V. Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More Questions than Answers, 30 TULSA L.J. 61, 100
(1994); see also infra Part II (discussing Winters).
6 SeeJudith V. Royster, Winters in the East: Tribal Reserved Rights to Water in Riparian
States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. & POL'x REv. 169, 169 (2000).
7
Furthermore, water regulation is "an important sovereign power." Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir. 1981).
8
SeeJoseph R. Membrino, Indian Reserved Water Rights, Federalism and the Trust Responsibility, 27 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 14 (1992) ("If one may mark the turn of the 20th
century by the massive expropriation of Indian lands, then the turn of the 21st century is
the era when the Indian tribes risk the same fate for their water resources.").
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reservations. To date, no court has recognized such a right.9 This
Article explores the possibility that a nonfederally recognized eastern
tribe could assert a Winters right, and posits that the barriers to such
an assertion may not be as forbidding as they initially seem. 10
In order to understand the legal regime under which reserved
water rights historically have arisen, as well as the systems in which,
this Article suggests, reserved water rights might be asserted, Part I
describes and compares three such systems for managing water flow.
These systems are common law riparianism, prior appropriation, and
regulated riparianism. 11 Part II examines the Winters doctrine, the
source of reserved tribal water rights, and how courts have interpreted
and applied the rights arising out of Winters. Part III puts forth several
doctrinal as well as normative and utilitarian arguments for why eastern tribes could assert reserved water rights. Part IV explains why the
lack of federal recognition and the absence of public lands, two presumed prerequisites for the assertion of Winters rights, should not be a
bar to their assertion.
This Article occasionally refers to the Mattaponi Indian Tribe,
whose reservation lies on the banks of the Mattaponi River in Virginia.1 2 The Mattaponi Tribe is party to a 1677 treaty between the
British Crown and Virginia's colonial government,' 3 the Treaty at
Middle Plantation, which reserves for the Tribe's exclusive use the
lands on which it resides today, t 4 including the rights to fish, hunt,
9 See, e.g., Royster, supra note 6, at 173 ("With one partial exception[, the Seminole
Water Rights Compact], tribal water rights have been litigated only in appropriation
states .... ").
10 Like many who write in the field of reserved Indian water rights, I am indebted to
the work of Judith V. Royster, whose piece Winters in the East: Tribal Reserved Rights to Water
in Riparian States sets the groundwork for much of what appears here. See Royster, supra
note 6; see also Royster, supra note 5, at 101-03 (introducing the idea of Winters rights in
riparian and "dual-system" states, i.e., states with both prior appropriation and riparian
water management legal regimes, such as California).
11
This Article's discussion of riparianism in both its traditional and regulated forms
frequently refers to Virginia's water law; this is because Virginia is the home state of the
Mattaponi Indian Tribe.
12 The Mattaponi Tribe is one of the few remaining descendant tribes of a paramount
chiefdom controlled by Powhatan, father of Pocahontas. It is one of a group of tribes that
entered into the Treaty at Middle Plantation with representatives of the British Crown in
1677, which among other things created the modern Mattaponi Indian Reservation. See
HELEN C. ROUNTREE, POCAHONTAS'S PEOPLE: THE POWHATAN INDIANS OF VIRGINIA THROUGH

FOUR CENTURIES 100-03 (1990).

The Tribe's perseverance is remarkable given all it has
endured since its first contact with Europeans, including Bacon's Rebellion, disease, and
the "black code," which denied Indians both the right to hold office in the colony as well as
access to the colonial court system. See id. at 97-99, 127, 142.
13
See Treaty at Middle Plantation with Tributary Indians After Bacon's Rebellion, arts.
III-IV, 1677, reprinted in 4 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 16071789, at 82-87 (Alden T. Vaughan & W. Stitt Robinson eds., 1983) [hereinafter Treaty at
Middle Plantation].
14
See id. at arts. III-IV.
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and gather on ancestral lands. 15 Since the mid-1990s, the Tribe has
fought the construction of a proposed 1,500-acre municipal reservoir
that would withdraw 75 million gallons of water per day from the Mattaponi River and flood the Tribe's ancestral lands. 16 The Tribe argues
that this withdrawal will disrupt the annual spawn of American shad
on which the Tribe depends for its food, economic livelihood, and
aboriginal practices. Virginia, the state in which the Tribe resides, is a
regulated riparian jurisdiction, and thus retains some features of common law riparianism while also adopting some features of a prior appropriation system. The Tribe's situation, therefore, illustrates some
of the points made in this Article.
I
THREE LEGAL DOCTRINES FOR MANAGING WATER FLOW

Three legal regimes apply to surface water allocation in the
United States:. riparianism, prior appropriation, and regulated riparianism. The eastern part of the country largely adheres to riparianism
and regulated riparianism, while the prior appropriation doctrine
dominates in the West. 17 Regulated riparianism arose in response to
both practical and equitable concerns with common law riparianism
and a growing sense that the common law doctrine was neither efficient nor promoted water conservation.' 8 To date, nearly half of the
eastern states where the common law riparian doctrine applies have
adopted statutes implementing some kind of administrative permit
system for the allocation of water, along with other features of the
prior appropriation doctrine, in an attempt to address these
problems. 19
In order to understand the ease, or difficulty, of integrating a reserved tribal water right into an existing legal regime, it is necessary to
know the key features of the existing system. Because prior appropria15 See id. at art. VII.
16 The Tribe has challenged the issuance of permits for the project in the Virginia
courts and in various federal and state agency proceedings, arguing that the permits will
violate its treaty-protected right to live unmolested on its reservation and to continue its
aboriginal uses of the Mattaponi River. The Institute for Public Representation at Georgetown University Law Center, of which I am a director, has represented the Mattaponi
Tribe in this matter since 1996.
17
The "Colorado doctrine," which governs water allocation in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, does not recognize riparian rights; the "California doctrine," which holds sway in California, Kansas, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington, allows riparian
rights to coexist with prior appropriative rights, even though the two doctrines are essentially incompatible. See Ausness, supra note 2, at 548 n.4 (observing that because of the
incompatibility of riparianism and prior appropriation, most "California doctrine" states
impose some "limitations on the exercise of riparian rights").
18 See Choe, supra note 2, at 1911.
19 See id. at 1912.
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tion is the only system to recognize reserved tribal water rights, identifying the features of that system that facilitate the recognition of such
rights and determining whether those features can be found in either
traditional or regulated riparian systems is important. Furthermore, it
is important to learn whether any aspect of traditional riparian law
creates barriers to the recognition of reserved tribal water rights and
whether these features are present in regulated riparian systems.
A.

Common Law Riparian Doctrine

Under the riparian doctrine, the right to use water arises from
owning land bordering a river, stream, or lake. 20 Thus, only people
who own land appurtenant to a watercourse can access and use that
water, and the riparian landowners can use that water only on the
parcels of land adjacent to such watercourse. 2 1 Two additional rules
limit the amount of flow that a riparian can divert or consume. Under
the first, the "natural flow" or "English rule," a riparian landowner has
the right to the natural flow of the water passing his land "not perceptibly retarded, diminished or polluted by others." 22 Under the natural
flow doctrine, a riparian may take all the water he or she requires "for
domestic or natural uses," even if doing so drains the entire water
source. 23 Second, under the "reasonable use" or "American rule," a
riparian may use a watercourse for any beneficial purpose so long as
that use does not interfere unreasonably with the legitimate water
needs and uses of other riparians. 24 Under the natural flow rule, "all
riparian owners possess correlative rights to use the water on or in connection with the land," and a riparian can maintain a claim that his or
her rights have been violated without having to prove damages. 25 In
See Ausness, supra note 2, at 548.
See id. In Virginia, riparian rights are severable from land and, like water rights
under a prior appropriation system, can be conveyed separately, but not to another water
basin. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Norfolk S. R.R. Co., 142 S.E. 405, 408 (Va. 1928) (allowing the
grantor to reserve a riparian right despite having conveyed fee simple title in the property
to the railroad).
22
Ausness, supra note 2, at 549.
23
See id. at 549 n.6.
24
See id. at 550; Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law
Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 286-87 (1990) (noting the origin of the "reasonable
use" doctrine in Joseph Story's opinion in Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I.
1827)).
25
Laura M. Zawisa, Case Note, 64 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 579, 580 n.12 (1987); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 note (1979) (Introductory Note on the Nature of
Riparian Rights and Legal Theories for Determination of the Rights) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (stating that under the natural flow doctrine, "the primary or fundamental right of
each riparian proprietor... is to have the body of water flow as it is wont to flow in nature,
qualified only by the privilege of each to make limited uses of the water").
20
21
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contrast, under the reasonable use rule, a riparian must show actual

27
damages. 26 Most riparian states adhere to the reasonable use rule.

Reasonableness under the American rule is a question of fact determined on a case-by-case basis.28 Thus, so long as other riparians
did not object and could not show injury, this rule would allow a riparian owner to use all of the water in a given watercourse. 29 The right
to use water under this rule is not unqualified, however, as other riparians can begin reasonable uses of the stream in the future and may
object to any previous uses that interfere with their new uses of the
30
stream.
There are numerous criticisms of the riparian doctrine in either
form. 31 First, because riparian rights are defined in relation to other
rights and must adapt to changes in those rights, water allocations
under the riparian doctrine are extremely uncertain and too indeterminate to encourage economic development. 3 2 A riparian has no per26
See Zawisa, supra note 25; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 25 (stating that under
the reasonable use doctrine, "the primary or fundamental right of each riparian proprietor.., is to be free from unreasonable uses that cause harm to his own reasonable use of
the water").
27
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 25. Rose describes an almost Darwinian evolution of
the earlier natural flow doctrine into the reasonable use doctrine, observing that the former "offered a workable system for allocating entitlements where the stable and relatively
low demand for water resources was only sporadically threatened by extreme individual
behaviors." Rose, supra note 24, at 266. In contrast, the latter "was better suited to the
industrial era that followed... [because] it permitted more intensive private utilization of
flowing water, in large measure because the system of correlative reasonable rights obviated the need for agreements among all the owners along the stream." Id.
28
See Ausness, supra note 2, at 549. Ausness lists some of the factors courts examine
to determine if a particular use is reasonable: climate, customs and previous uses, the watercourse's capacity to sustain the proposed use, the amount of water taken, the social
importance of the use, and the rights and reasonable needs of other riparian owners. See
id. at 550.
29
See id. Rose describes this possibility as characteristic of a "common pool, in which
the total value to riparians was increased by allowing some modicum of damage from each
riparian's use so long as the bulk of the river flow was retained for all." Rose, supra note 24,
at 266.
30
See Ausness, supra note 2, at 550 ("[A] use which is reasonable under existing circumstances may subsequently become unreasonable when others begin to use the watercourse."). In Virginia, riparian rights are "qualified property rights incident to the
ownership of the soil through or by which the waters of a stream flow," thus giving riparian
owners a little more certainty regarding their rights. Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 140
S.E.2d 678, 680 (Va. 1965) (quoting Hite v. Town of Luray, 8 S.E.2d 369, 372 (Va. 1940)).
31
See Choe, supra note 2, at 1911-12 (listing the following as flaws of the riparian
doctrine: the doctrine fails to "protect against excessive diversions by riparians, or to ensure minimum stream flows for the public"; being "correlatively defined, and thus [capable
of] shift[ing] over time as neighboring users and uses change[ ]," riparian rights are inherently uncertain, which thus "inhibit[si investment and prevent[s] the development of markets in transferable water rights"; and, by "favoring private agrarian interests" and
"lack[ing] a procedural mechanism for reallocating resources to those in need during
times of scarcity," the doctrine is inherently inequitable).
32
See Ausness, supra note 2, at 552-53 (describing riparian rights as "vague and uncertain," and arguing that under the reasonable use rule, "one cannot be certain who may use
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manent right to a particular quantity of water, in that a subsequent
water use can defeat a prior use either completely or partially.3 3 Second, since the doctrine requires that riparian water be used on adjacent land, it cannot be transferred to a more beneficial use on
nonriparian land.3 4 This qualification results in inefficient uses of
water. 35 Third, because the doctrine allows for the complete consumption of a watercourse, and limitations on withdrawals come solely
from other users, the doctrine neither favors nor promotes conservation.3 6 Fourth, the balancing test employed under the reasonable use
rule unfairly favors large landowners and does not necessarily lead to
optimal water use.3 7 Fifth, no mechanism exists for reallocating riparian water rights from a wasteful or less socially useful purpose to a
more beneficial purpose. 38 Finally, as there is no ex ante way of avoiding or resolving them, disputes between riparians often result in lawsuits, which are expensive and filled with uncertainty as their
39
outcomes may vary from judge to judge and stream to stream.
There are positive features of riparianism, however. Restricting
the use of withdrawn water to appurtenant land limits the amount of
water that can be withdrawn to the needs of a defined piece of propthe available water or how much and for what purpose it may be used... because water use
must be reasonable relative to uses of other riparian owners, and these other uses constantly change"). Ausness lists as additional deficiencies of the doctrine that it "fails to
recognize the relationship between surface water and ground water," thereby making a
uniform rule for the allocation of water difficult, if not impossible, to achieve, and that the
riparian system lacks "an efficient mechanism for resolving disputes among competing
water users." Id. at 553.
33
A. Dan Tarlock notes that the Restatement (Second) of Torts has somewhat alleviated this problem "by introducing a modified theory of priority" under which "'protection
of existing values of water uses, land, [and) investments' should be considered in determining the reasonableness of a new use." A. Dan Tarlock, Introduction, 24 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 535, 540 (1983) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979)).
34
In Virginia, for example, even though riparian rights can be severed from the land,
they can only be used on land within the watershed so that any unused water drains back
into its original source. See Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 106 S.E. 508, 511-12 (Va. 1921).
Thus, even an important public use may not be permissible. See, e.g., Town of Purcellville
v. Potts, 19 S.E.2d 700, 701-03 (Va. 1942) (holding that a municipality as a riparian owner
was not allowed to divert water from its riparian land, even for the purposes of constructing
a public water system).
35
See Choe, supra note 2, at 1928.
36
See id. at 1911.
37
SeeJoseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States at the
Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REv. 9, 17 (2002); see also
Choe, supra note 2, at 1911 ("[R]iparianism was accused of favoring private agrarian
interests.").
38
See Dellapenna, supra note 37, at 16 (" [T]here is no process for managing water in
times of extreme shortage or for otherwise protecting public values.").
39
See Ausness, supra note 2, at 553 ("Not only are lawsuits time-consuming, expensive,
and uncertain in outcome, but the results even of successful litigation often are narrow
and limited.").
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erty4° or riparian owner. 41 Further, the notion of appurtenancy embodies a communal principle since it involves a "web of
interrelationships and monitoring that characterizes [any] common
property regime." 42 Carol Rose notes that "riparian law in the nineteenth century effectively turned river-bank landowners into participants in common property regimes . ..from which outsiders were

excluded." 4 3 This means that people nearest to the resource will "develop sustainable practices and ...monitor each other's usage" of the
resource, 4 4 which scholars of communal property such as Rose and
Elinor Ostrom have demonstrated to be an effective system of re45
source management.
The reasonable use or American rule requires that later riparians
justify their interference with existing riparian uses as more socially
beneficial. 46 Moreover, the reasonable use rule's requirement that a
downstream riparian show actual injury in order to defeat an upstream riparian use imposes an additional limit on the amount of
water that riparians can claim under the doctrine. 4 7 Finally, as a crea-

40
See Choe, supra note 2, at 1928 ("Appurtenancy and its sister doctrines may have
tried to cap usage by drawing on the proxies of adjacency, watershed boundaries, and
parcel size, just as medieval peasants relied on sheeps' digestive systems, and Maine lobstermen relied on the size of standard fishing traps.").
41
See Choe, supra note 2, at 1923 (suggesting that by "limiting access to a group of
users defined by their proximity to the resource," the appurtenancy doctrine's ownership
feature "can assist in the conservation of a common-pool resource"); see also Rose, supra
note 24, at 291-92 (explaining that eastern riparian rights did not develop out of individualistic, consumptive water uses but rather grew out of a need for power, a public or common good).
42
Choe, supra note 2, at 1922.
43
Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 179 (1998); see also David H. Getches, Water
Rights on Indian Allotments, 26 S.D. L. REV. 405, 416 (1981) (noting that Indian reserved
water rights, like their treaty-based right "to fish at certain usual and accustomed places,"
are communal).
44
Choe, supra note 2, at 1923.
45
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECrIVE AcTION 58-102 (1990) (analyzing the organization of "common-pool resources" in Switzerland, Japan, Spain, and the Philippines and setting out seven principles
that make such organizations effective); Rose, supra note 43, at 157 ("In [common property regimes], informal norms and user-created enforcement techniques may go some distance toward self-policing and perimeter defense.").
46
See Choe, supra note 2, at 1938. Choe describes how agencies in regulated riparian
systems consider "'the economic and social importance of the proposed water use and
other existing or planned water uses sharing the water source'" when making permit decisions. Id. (quoting THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE § 6R-3-02 (Joseph W.
Dellapenna ed., 1997)).
47
See Seeley v. Brush, 35 Conn. 419, 423 (1868) (holding that "riparian proprietors
are bound so to use their rights as not to cause any material or appreciable injury to [other
riparians'] rights").
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ture of the common law, the riparian doctrine is infinitely malleable
48
and responsive to changing circumstances and social needs.
While riparian rights offer some promise for tribes as a source of
water, the problems noted above-the impermanence of the right,
the barriers to out-of-basin transfers inhibiting water marketing, and
the bias toward large landowners-make it a less-than-perfect solution
for tribes. 49 In addition, there are several problems with riparian
ights specific to tribes. First, federally recognized tribes are not landowners, since the government holds their reservations in trust. 50 This
may act as a barrier to the assertion of riparian rights, which attach to
fee ownership of appurtenant land. 51 Further, while most tribes could
show that their use of a stream is reasonable to the extent that the
water is for a domestic or stock-watering use, 52 it is unclear whether
fishing or maintaining water instream as a fish habitat in the face of a
demand for water by an upstream riparian would qualify as a reasonable use. Another problem for tribes in showing injury from upstream
diversion is establishing that insufficient water remains for the tribes'
reasonable uses. 53 Thus, although tribes might secure a water supply
as occupiers, and sometimes owners, of riparian lands, the limitations
48
See Rose, supra note 24 (describing the historical development of riparian law during the early part of Anglo-American industrialization); Tarlock, supra note 33, at 538 (suggesting that eastern water law's "flexibility is a strength, not a weakness," and that it is
superior to western water law because it regards "nonconsumptive uses [as being] at least
as important as consumptive uses"); see also Choe, supra note 2, at 1929-30 (noting that
some states have abandoned riparian doctrine's appurtenancy requirement in allowing interbasin transfers of water to augment its efficient use and stating that "the general trend
has been away from appurtenancy and toward increasing nonriparian use"). Choe also
notes that courts have expanded what qualifies as a "reasonable use" of a water source's
flow to allow its complete consumption as long as downstream riparian landowners either
do not complain or cannot show injury. See id. at 1930-35.
49
See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1069,
See, e.g.,
50
1094 (2004) (stating that the United States government holds the "great majority of Indian
lands" in trust).
51
See Richard W. Bartke & Susan Hedges Patton, Water Based RecreationalDevelopments
in Michigan-Problems of Developers, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 1005, 1009 (1979) (noting that
"[r]iparian rights arise by virtue of title to the bank or shore"). But to the extent that
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905), holds that rights not ceded by tribes in
treaties remain with them, which would include the right to sufficient water to sustain their
traditional uses, tribes may be able to overcome the problem of not possessing fee title to
appurtenant land. Cf Buchanan v. Norfolk S. R.R. Co., 142 S.E. 405, 408 (Va. 1928) (holding that lessees of fishery rights had the riparian right to "limited use of the adjacent
shores" because otherwise "[t]he lease would have been utterly worthless to [them]").
52
See Douglas W. MacDougal, PrivateHopes and Public Values in the "Reasonable Beneficial Use" of Hawaii's Water: Is Balance Possible?, 18 U. HAw.L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1996) ("Domestic, municipal, agricultural and industrial uses are universally regarded as beneficial.").
53
See Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 106 S.E. 508, 514 (Va. 1921) (stating that "in an
action for damages or suit for injunction by a lower against an upper riparian landowner
for wrongful diversion of water by the latter ...the plaintiff... must show some substantial
actual damage occasioned by the diminution of the quantity of the water which the plaintiff has the right to use").
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and problems with the riparian doctrine make it an unappealing foundation for water rights claims.
B.

Prior Appropriation Doctrine

The prior appropriation doctrine, which dominates water law in
the arid and semiarid areas of the western United States, is the antithesis of common law riparianism. 5 4 In contrast to riparians, holders of
appropriative rights may transfer their rights out of basin and among
various owners. 55 Unlike holders of riparian rights, appropriated
water rights holders can lose their rights by abandoning them or allowing them to fall into disuse. 56 Appropriators, therefore, must "use
it or lose it," an incentive that often leads to wasting water in order to
avoid losing rights. Under the "first in time, first in right" rubric, appropriative water rights are accorded on a priority basis. 57 In times of
shortage, a junior appropriator can lose any rights to water if a senior
appropriator dewaters or substantially reduces the entire watercourse. 58 Unlike the riparian system, the prior appropriation doctrine
neither recognizes correlative rights nor perceives any need to keep
water in the stream. 59 Although a usufruct in form, using water for a
60
beneficial purpose creates a property right in the appropriator.
Water rights under the prior appropriation doctrine primarily
arise under state law and are subject to permit as part of comprehensive regulatory systems. 61 State regulators can condition, modify, or
deny a permit application to protect other users or to pursue a public
good such as recreation or fishery maintenance. 62 State administrative agencies allocate rights in an ex ante fashion, as opposed to
judges who make post hoc decrees in the riparian system. 63 Under
See Choe, supra note 2, at 1909 n.1.
See Strickler v. Colo. Springs, 26 P. 313, 317 (Colo. 1891); see also Coffin v. Left
Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447-49 (1882) (holding that common law riparian doctrine
did not apply in Colorado and giving preemptive rights to prior appropriators, including
the right to divert water from a stream to irrigate nonadjacent land).
56
See Ausness, supra note 2, at 555.
57
See id.
54
55

58

See id.

See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Future of Western Water Law and Policy, in INDIAN WATER
1985: COLLECTED EssAYs 51, 52 (Christine L. Miklas & StevenJ. Shupe eds., 1986) [hereinafter INDIAN WATER].
60
See Katherine Lamere Mead, Wyoming's Experience with Federal Non-Indian Reserved
Rights: The Big Horn Adjudication, 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. 433, 438 n.46 (1986).
61
See Ausness, supra note 2, at 555.
62
But see Tarlock, supra note 33, at 538 (noting that despite the fact that permit programs acknowledge nonconsumptive uses such as "aesthetic enhancement, fish and wildlife protection, pollution abatement, and recreation," permit programs may "undervalue"
such uses if no one applies for a permit for them).
63
See Choe, supra note 2, at 1911-12.
59
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the prior appropriation system, state law even administers federally
64
reserved water rights.
Western states adopted the prior appropriation system in response to the nature of the western water supply and its uses. Charles
Wilkinson attributes the West's rejection of the riparian doctrine in
favor of prior appropriation to the specific needs of miners in waterpoor areas. 65 The miners required large amounts of water in order to
flood mine workings, separate gold nuggets from river gravel, and
blast out placer deposits in canyon walls far from the water's source. 66
Miners developed the basic elements of the prior appropriation doctrine identified above. 67 Over time, state courts 68 and eventually the

United States Supreme Court 69 and Congress 70 recognized these
elements.
Farmers, who needed above-average rainfall to irrigate their
crops, soon replaced the miners.7 ' The farmers similarly benefited
from a doctrine that allowed them to transfer water and guaranteed
64
See United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle (Eagle County),
401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971) (holding that the provision of the McCarran Amendment that
provides a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States in the context of
water rights adjudications, 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2000), subjects federal reserved water rights
to adjudication in state court); see also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 809-10 (1976) (extending the reasoning behind Eagle County to federally reserved water rights on behalf of tribes); Royster, supra note 5, at 97-98 (stating that
Colorado River "created a new abstention doctrine" that does not divest federal courts of
concurrent jurisdiction over federal reserved water rights but encourages them to refrain
from exercising their jurisdiction in favor of state courts).
65
See Wilkinson, supra note 59, at 51-52.
66

See id. ("Water was not an amenity in Gold Rush times, it was an engine."). But see

JOHN SHURTS, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE WiNTERs DOCTRINE IN ITS SOCIAL AND

LEGAL CONTEXT, 1880s-1930s, at 40 (2000) (describing how the "first wave of miners" used
a variety of "preexisting and reworked legal traditions, including practical variations of the
riparian doctrine," and stating that "a great number of western settlers, miners, politicians,
writers, lawyers, and judges" from the mid- to late-nineteenth century "were comfortable
working with and preferred other water allocation systems" and therefore criticized prior
appropriation "as a giveaway of something valuable to the people and as tending toward
unfair, private monopolization of a precious resource"); see also id. at 41 ("The 'victory' of
the prior appropriation system was always a contested and contingent affair.").
67
See Rose, supra note 24, at 289. Rose notes that the informal system of appropriative water rights developed by miners was one of "occupancy" not just of particular locations, as it was originally in the East, but of entire watercourses. Id.
See Wilkinson, supra note 59, at 52 (describing how water rights rules "'firmly fixed'
68
by 'a universal sense of necessity and propriety' in the mining camps" were first upheld by
the California Supreme Court in Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855), and then by other
Rocky Mountain state courts (quoting Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1885))).
See Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64
69
(1935).
70
See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 26 (2000) (giving miners the exclusive right of possession of
the surface of their mining claims).
71
See Wilkinson, supra note 59, at 52-53.
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them a fixed quantity of water as long as they put the water to a bene72
ficial use.
The prior appropriation system introduced stability, clarity, and
permanence into a system for allocating surface water that had been
inherently unstable, opaque, and uncertain. 73 Under the prior appropriation doctrine, every holder of water rights knows where she stands
in relation to other rights holders; rights are allocated in perpetuity
and can be "diminished or terminated [only] through abandonment,
forfeiture, or lack of beneficial use." 74 As a result, people can invest in
water development or diversion projects without fear that allocated
75
amounts will be reduced, transferred away, or lost completely.
Nonetheless, the system has its flaws. The prior appropriation
doctrine responds slowly to changing circumstances and needs because of the resistance of vested interests. 76 Its "use it or lose it"
dogma encourages waste and generally inefficient practices 7 7 and favors established interests. 78 As Rose has described it, prior appropriation is a "zero-sum game" in which one user benefits at the expense of
79
another.
72 See id. at 53. Wilkinson identifies "the provision of subsidized water for irrigators"
as being one of the themes that has dominated traditional water law in the West. Id.
73 See id. (identifying "state control; stable priority for historic uses; concern for private rights over public rights; [and] preference for consumptive, usually commercial, uses"
as the major themes of traditional water law in the West). Ausness argues that "[a] n important objective of any system of water rights is to encourage optimal use of the resource,"
which can be achieved if water rights are "both specific and secure[,] ... specific so that
the water user knows what he has, and .. .secure so that he knows where he stands in
relation to other users." Ausness, supra note 2, at 576. The system must be both sufficiently flexible to permit the "transfer of water from less productive to more productive
uses" and fair, defined as "equal access to the resource, freedom from arbitrary treatment,
and assurances that reasonable expectations will not be frustrated by a regulatory agency."
Id.
74 Tarlock, supra note 33, at 536 n.3.
75 See Todd S. Hageman, Water Law: Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Resources Board: The Oklahoma Supreme Court's Resurrection of Riparian Rights Leaves Municipal
Water Supplies High and Dry, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 183, 185 (1994) (noting that "[p]rior appropriation encourages urban growth by giving local governments predictability when planning for their water supply," which results from the fact that they can assert water rights
without worrying about later appropriators interfering with or taking those rights).
76 See Mark A. Weitz, CongressmanJohnJ Rhodes and Representation: The Case of Native
American Water Rights, W. LEGAL HIST., Winter/Spring 1999, at 79-80.
77 SeeJane Maslow Cohen, Foreword: Of Waterbanks, Piggybanks, and Bankruptcy: Changing Directions in Water Law, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1809, 1840 (2005).
78
See Weitz, supra note 76, at 79-80. As former Navajo Tribal Chairman Peterson Zah
said when commenting on his tribe's pursuit of water rights: "When I was a kid in geography class, I was taught that water always flows downhill .... What I've learned since is that
water flows to money and power, wherever they may be." LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN
WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW, at ix (1991).
79 Rose, supra note 24, at 291. Rose contrasts this "zero-sum game" with what happened in the East, where the primary use of water was instream power, which entails "use
and relinquishment among the group of riparian owners, so that the volume of the water
may be used again and again on its way downstream." Id.
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The federal courts have, however, intervened in response to some
of the criticisms of prior appropriation, noted above. 80 Factors that
have increased public scrutiny of western water law and policy include
budget constraints limiting federal irrigation subsidies, overappropriation of water as a result of continuing westward migration,
groundwater mining and the realization that groundwater is not renewable, the hydrological connection between surface and groundwater requiring their "conjunctive management," and the need to
attend to pollution. 8 1 To that list one can add an array of federal
statutes that have drawn attention to the problems with the prior appropriation doctrine. These statutes include the Endangered Species
Act, 8 2 the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 8 3 the Wilderness Act,84 the Fed86
85
eral Land Policy and Management Act, and various forestry laws

requiring conservation of water resources to meet ecosystem and wildlife needs, unmet tribal rights to water, and an unprecedented recent
cycle of drought, which has strained already overappropriated resources. 8 7 Wilkinson envisions an expanded federal presence in setting the contours of western water law, an increased emphasis on
conservation to meet not only domestic and commercial uses but also
recreational uses requiring sufficient water instream to meet the
needs of fish, wildlife, recreation, and aesthetics. 8

8

These changes are

resulting in appropriative rights being less absolute than they once
89
were.

See Heather R. Brinton, Note, Arizona v. California: Riding the Wave of FederalRipari80
anism, 13 VILL. ENVrL. L.J. 59, 60, 62 (2002) (suggesting that in Arizona v. California (Arizona 1), 373 U.S. 546 (1963), the Supreme Court made "a deliberate move away from
private interests and toward a [federal] riparian, public notion of water distribution,"
which could potentially have deleterious effects on the West).
81
See Wilkinson, supra note 59, at 54.
82 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
83
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
84 Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
85 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat.
2743 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
86 U.S. Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2000); Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); National Forest
Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
87 For example, the Colorado River has endured five years of "the worst drought in
the region's recorded history," prompting representatives from the seven state members of
the Colorado Compact to "argu[e] about what, exactly, will happen when there's not
enough water to go around." Matt Jenkins, On the Colorado River, a Tug-of-War on a Tightrope, HIGH CouNTRY NEWS, May 16, 2005, at 5.
88
See Wilkinson, supra note 59, at 58-61.
89 See id. at 63. As an example of the weakening of the absolute nature of prior appropriation rights, Wilkinson cites the "public trust doctrine," which many states have
adopted. Id. This doctrine creates "an implied condition . . . that major environmental
resources cannot be destroyed." Id.
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Regulated Riparianism

In response to the perceived inadequacies of common law riparianism and increased water shortages in the East, about half of the
eastern states have moved toward a hybrid system of water management. 90 Regulated riparianism combines features of both common
law riparianism and the prior appropriation doctrine. 9 1
In general, these laws require that prospective consumers of surface water apply for "a limited-duration, renewable permit from a state
administrative agency." 92 These permits explicitly or implicitly incorporate the western "beneficial use standard" and specify when and
93
where a specific amount of water may be used.
There are, however, fundamental differences between regulated
riparian systems and the prior appropriation system. For example, although almost all regulated riparian systems allow nonriparians to obtain permits, 9 4 these permits, unlike their western counterparts, still
attach to land and are nontransferable 9 5 unless otherwise authorized
by the state legislature. 96 Also, unlike the prior appropriation system,
under which water rights can be lost only if they are abandoned or not
used,9 7 eastern administrative agencies can use their discretion to terminate or modify permits or issue permits for a fixed period of time in
90 See Choe, supra note 2, at 1912.
91 See Ausness, supra note 2, at 554 ("[V]irtually all the [water] permit systems in the
East incorporate some features of the prior appropriation system."). Rose questions
whether this move toward a system of individualized property rights for common-pool resources is either a necessary evolutionary step in water management or a good thing with
respect to managing and protecting a public good. See Rose, supra note 24, at 293-94. She
notes that several western states have "pulled back" from viewing water as an individual
property right and "are once again looking at water as something more akin to a . . .
common resource." Id. at 294.
92 Choe, supra note 2, at 1912.
93 See Ausness, supra note 2, at 554-55. For example, the Virginia Water Control Law
requires the acquisition of water withdrawal permits and the protection of "instream beneficial uses." Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.15:5(B) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005). Virginia law
defines a "beneficial use" as "[t]
he preservation of instream flows for purposes of the protection of navigation, maintenance of waste assimilation capacity, the protection of fish
and wildlife resources and habitat, recreation, cultural, and aesthetic values." Id. at § 62.144.15(C). The Mattaponi Tribe challenged a permitting agency's grant of a reservoir permit as being contrary to this statute on the ground that in granting the permit the agency
ignored the tribe's treaty-protected beneficial cultural uses of the Mattaponi River, which
include traditional fishing and ceremonial activities. See Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 920, 922-23 (Va. 2001).
94 See Ausness, supra note 2, at 554.
95 See id. at 555.
96 See Robert Haskell Abrams, Interbasin Transfer in a RiparianJurisdiction,24 WM. &
MARY L. Riv. 591, 604-05 (1983) (noting that "[u]ntil an express legislative scheme governing interbasin transfers is enacted," Virginia's common law pertaining to riparian rights
will control).
97
See Ausness, supra note 2, at 555.
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order to reallocate water for a higher or more socially beneficial use. 98
Finally, eastern laws generally do not recognize the priority system, a
fundamental element of the western system that allows senior rights
holders to defeat completely the rights ofjunior permittees in times of
water shortage. 99 Senior permittees receive some protection under a
regulated riparian system in that common law riparianism blocks the
issuance of new permits if the permits would interfere with the water
rights of existing permit holders.' 0 0 In times of water shortage, however, this system does not protect senior permittees from a reduction
in their rights, a protection the prior appropriation system would afford them. 10 1
These regulated riparian legal regimes in the East also have their
critics. Rose finds these regimes wanting to the extent that they have
moved eastern states toward a system of individualized property rights,
which she finds unsuited to a common-pool resource that is a public
good. 10 2 Indeed, she notes that the eastern states, at the start of the
industrial era, actively considered adopting a water rights system similar to the prior appropriation doctrine later adopted in the West, but
that eastern courts decided against this, finding "riparianiism more
0
suited to their environment."'

3

Tarlock believes that looking at "eastern water problems through
western eyes" and assuming that as scarcity and competition increase,
water law "will inevitably follow the western water rights model either
by adopting the doctrine of prior appropriation or by adopting the
central feature of the doctrine which is a system of relatively secure
private property rights" is misguided. 10 4 Water is still relatively abundant in the East such that most allocation problems there "do not
center exclusively on allocating scarce supplies among competing private parties or public entities."'1 5 Tarlock argues instead that most
98
99

See id.
See id.

See State Water Control Bd. v. Crutchfield, 578 S.E.2d 762, 768-69 (Va. 2003) (finding that riparian landowners had established actionable injury to their existing recreational
uses of a river by the water board's grant of a permit to the county to discharge wastewater
fifty yards upstream from their recreational area); Ausness, supra note 2, at 555-56.
101
See Ausness, supra note 2, at 555-56. In Virginia, as a continuing vestige of the
riparian system, any riparian-rights holder who wishes to divert water from a watercourse
must acquire the downstream riparians' rights if such a diversion will injure them. See
Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 19 S.E.2d 700, 703 (Va. 1942). But see Thurston v. City of
Portsmouth, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680 (Va. 1965) (stating that if riparian rights are needed to
fulfill a "public purpose," then the government can take them by virtue of its eminent
domain power).
102
See Rose, supra note 24, at 266-67 ("The larger moral is that there is no universal
presumption that systems of private individual rights must necessarily dominate systems of
collective ownership.").
'00

103
104
105

See id. at 266.

Tarlock, supra note 33, at 536.
See id. at 537.
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water use problems involve water quality and center on how land is
10 6
used; they do not involve consumptive uses or private rights.
Richard Ausness finds fault with many of the regulated riparian
regimes because they do not respond to what he identifies as the "utilitarian" and "fairness" goals of effective water allocation regimes, in
that many regulated riparian laws exempt large water users-domestic
and industrial users, farmers, municipalities-from regulation. 10 7 According to Ausness, these laws fail to provide adequately for shortterm water shortages and lack adequate mechanisms for reallocating
water to more productive uses.108
Olivia Choe argues that the exemptions Ausness targets actually
create an additional problem, namely the perception that these systems offer a "'piecemeal"' approach that is both "incoherent ...and

protective of inefficient uses."'10 9 Moreover, in situations where agencies do require permits, the agencies "tend to favor existing or
grandfathered uses." 1 10 This prevents agencies from redistributing
permits to more socially beneficial uses.1'1 Choe further complains
that since the rights bestowed by permits are "temporary and often
'use-specific,' voluntary transfer markets have failed to develop" and
"conservation-oriented norms" have not been integrated into agency
policy.

112

Thus, these "permitting systems have not proved much more successful than their common law predecessor in addressing problems of
conservation, efficiency, and equity."' "1 3 The questions remain, however, whether these doctrinal shortcomings indicate which legal system better suits reserved tribal rights and whether the shortcomings of
the riparian doctrine or regulated riparianism suggest that those systems are incompatible with reserved water rights.

See id. at 537-38.
See Ausness, supra note 2, at 576-79.
108
See id.at 579-89. Ausness would subject voluntary water transfers to approval by
state regulatory agencies to avoid "spillover effects," such as "alterations in return flow,
water pollution, waste, and diminution of supply." Id. at 588 (footnotes omitted).
109 Choe, supra note 2, at 1912 (quoting George William Sherk, Eastern Water Law:
Trends in State Legislation, 9 VA. ENNrL. L.J. 287, 290 (1990)).
110 Id.
I1
See id.
112 Id. at 1912-13 (quoting Robert H. Abrams, Water Allocation by Comprehensive Permit
Systems in the East: Consideringa Move Away from Orthodoxy, 9 VA. ENvTL L.J. 255, 281 (1990)).
113
Id. at 1913.
106
107
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II
RESERVED TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS

A.

The Origins of Reserved Tribal Water Rights-The Winters
14
Doctrine"

The origin of the reserved tribal water rights doctrine' 15 is found
in Winters v. United States,' t 6 a case involving a claim by several Montana tribes to water that flowed past their reservation. The Court in
Winters ruled that when the federal government established a reservation for the tribes, it implicitly reserved water sufficient for their purposes.' 1 7 Over time, the federal courts expanded the doctrine
announced in Winters to apply to non-Indian public lands and resources.1 18 For a long time after Winters, western tribes found themselves with largely "paper water," partly because the federal
government was reluctant to advocate on their behalf, and partly because the McCarran Amendment ni 9 subjected their claims to state administrative jurisdiction, 12 0 which had historically favored non-Indian
114
Shurts points out that the name "Winters doctrine" "immortalize [s] the misspelled
name of Henry Winter," a local rancher who had fled the United States before the
appellate decisions were handed down because of revelations about his plan to kill a stock
inspector and a local judge. SHURTS, supra note 66, at 150, 287 n.12.
115 "Western water law is based on two doctrines: prior appropriation and implied reservation. [The former] is a use-based doctrine for acquiring water rights. [The latter] is a
need-based doctrine employed by the federal government to reserve water rights for federal lands." Kurt Sommer, Ninth Circuit Rules that Disclaimer States Lack Jurisdiction over Indian Water Rights Under the McCarran Amendment, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255, 257 (1983).
Tribal reserved water rights are a specialized subcategory of implied federal reserved water
rights. See id. at 258-59.
116 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Several detailed historical analyses of the legal context of the
Winters decision demonstrate that the decision was not an anomaly at the time it was rendered. See generally Norris Hundley, Jr., The "Winters" Decision and Indian Water Rights: A
Mystery Reexamined, 13 W. His. Q. 17 (1982) (describing the struggle for water between
Indians and non-Indians in the West that lead up to the Winters decision); SHURTS, supra
note 66 (explaining that the Winters decision was a logical outgrowth of the political and
legal developments in the West that lead up to it).
117 See Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
118 See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 147 (1976) (finding that a presidential
proclamation establishing as a national monument a cavern that is home to a unique species of fish reserved sufficient water to protect the endangered fish); Arizona v. California
(Arizona 1), 373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963) (holding that the federal government could
assert reserved federal water rights on behalf of Indian reservations as well as wildlife refuges, national forests, and federal recreation areas); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349
U.S. 435 (1955) (holding that state prior appropriation law specifically excluded the public
domain from acquiring reclamation water). But see United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S.
696, 715-18 (1978) (limiting reserved federal water rights to only the primary purposes for
which land was withdrawn).
119 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000).
120 See id.; see also Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 567
(1983) (criticizing concurrent federal and state court proceedings as "duplicative and
wasteful, generating 'additional litigation through permitting inconsistent dispositions of
property'" (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
819 (1976))); Ann E. Amundson, Recent JudicialDecisions Involving Indian Water Rights, in
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claimants and was unsympathetic to claims of unique rights by Indians. 12 1 The situation is now different.' 22 Tribes are asserting their
reserved water rights, and unadjudicated Winters rights remain a major uncertainty in some water-based economies in the West. 12 3 This
specter of unquantified water rights has spawned many critics of the
INDIAN WATER, supra note 59, at 3, 5-11 (discussing the San CarlosApache Tribe decision and
its effect on the jurisdictional question in federal courts).
121 See Reid Peyton Chambers & John E. Echohawk, Implementing the Winters Doctrine of
Indian Reserved Water Rights: ProducingIndian Water and Economic Development Without Injuring Non-Indian Water Users?, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 447, 455 (1991/92) (describing how tribes
"bitterly resisted" state courts adjudicating their water rights); Charles F. Wilkinson, Perspectives on Water and Energy in the American West and in Indian Country, 26 S.D. L. REv. 393, 398
& n.24 (1981) (commenting on the devastating effects of the Indian fish war in the Pacific
Northwest and noting that the Supreme Court made the following observation regarding
state officials' behavior in response to this conflict: "'Except for some desegregation cases,
the district court has faced the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a
decree of a federal court witnessed in this century.'" (quoting Washington v. Wash. State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 696 n.36 (1979))).
122
See Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 121, at 457-62 (stating that since Arizona I
there has been a "significant increase in Indian irrigated agriculture and other water uses,"
such as "municipal development, industrial use, [and] the protection of fish and wildlife,"
largely achieved through negotiated settlements with Congress). The issue of whether
tribes should negotiate their reserved rights has generated conflicting views. Compare id. at
462-64 (noting that the negotiation of Indian water rights results not only in a fixed quantity of water but also federal monetary contributions for both water development projects
and general tribal economic improvements), and Royster, supra note 5, at 100 ("Settlements offer both tribes and states advantages over protracted litigation. Negotiated settlements are flexible to accommodate local needs, and they provide cheaper and faster
resolution of difficult issues. Tribes receive 'wet' water rather than mere paper rights, and
states gain the desired certainty of water rights." (quoting Daina Upite, Note, Resolving
Indian Reserved Water Rights in the Wake of San Carlos Apache Tribe, 15 ENVrL. L. 181, 199
(1984))), and Wilkinson, supra note 59, at 65-66 (arguing that all parties "have an interest
in negotiated settlement, not out of weakness but out of wisdom" because of the enormous
complexity of litigating water rights), and KirkJohnson, How DroughtJust Might Bring Water
to the Navajo, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at A16 (discussing a recent settlement between the
Navajo Nation and New Mexico allocating flow levels in the San Juan River, a branch of the
Colorado River), with LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF
LAw 7 (Univ. Press Kansas 1991) ("A stark parallel may be drawn between the process
which created the Indian reservations in the nineteenth century, when the tribes relinquished theoretical sovereignty over vast areas in return for federally protected control
over much smaller amounts of land, and the process of current western water-rights negotiations, in which the federal executive branch, the states, and assorted business interests are
urging tribes to abandon theoretical water-rights claims in return for federal delivery of
much smaller amounts of water."), and id. at 124 (pointing out the "lack of consistency"
among various negotiated water rights settlements and a "settlement process [that] has
become a legislative free-for-all," whereby some tribes achieve better settlement terms than
others), and Royster, supra note 5, at 78 ("In virtually all settlements, the tribes have agreed
to less water than they would be entitled to under their Winters rights.").
123 See Wilkinson, supra note 121, at 396-97 (predicting "significant dislocations in local water-based economies... [should Indians] receive their just entitlement of water"); see
alsoJohnson, supra note 122 (describing how fear of "a 'call' of water rights" in response to
a particularly severe drought combined with Indians' superior rights led to a negotiated
settlement of various claims to the San Juan River's flow). To provide a sense of the magnitude of Indian water rights, the Western States Water Council, in a 1984 report to the
Western Governors' Association, calculated that they might equal "45 million acre-feet per
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Winters doctrine. 12 4 Nonetheless, it is important to understand the
doctrine's origins, its normative underpinnings, the extent to which it
is an anomaly in a prior appropriation system, and its unfulfilled
promise in that system as part of the search for the answer to the question whether an eastern tribe in a riparian jurisdiction could, and
should, assert Winters rights.
Winters involved competing claims to the flow of the Milk River in
Montana by the tribes of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation and
upstream ranchers. 1 25 The latter had acquired land ceded by the
tribes in exchange for the government's promise to help the tribes
move to a lifestyle of "sedentary pastoralism and agriculturalism."' 2 6
The Fort Belknap tribes "had been nomadic hunters and gatherers
with aboriginal title to large areas of land"'127 broken up under the
General Allotment Act of 1887.128 Congress established the reservation in 1888 to provide "a permanent home and abiding place" for the
tribes. 129 During a severe drought in 1900, upstream appropriators
diverted water from the Milk River to irrigate their crops, relying on
state-issued water rights and thereby prompting the federal government to sue on behalf of the tribes to stop the diversions. 130 The govyear, an amount more than three times the annual flow of the Colorado River." Wilkinson,
supra note 59, at 55.
124
See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 122, at 61 ("The Winters doctrine may sound just and
honorable in the abstract, but because of earlier congressional and executive inattention,
the [economic and social dislocation] costs of its implementation are now substantial.");
Charles Corker, A Real Live Problem or Two for the Waning Energies of Frank J Trelease, 54
DEN-v. L.J. 499, 499-500 (1977) (calling the implied federal reservation doctrine "a rhetorical, chimerical phantasmagoria"); Anne E. Ross, Water Rights: Aboriginal Water Use and Water
Law in the Southwestern United States: Why the Reserved Rights Doctrine Was Inappropriate,9 Am.
INDIAN L. REv. 195, 195 (1981) ("[T]he doctrine of reserved rights... is attacked as unfair
to the Indians because it limits the uses for which they may appropriate water and their
ability to alienate their water rights, and as unfair to non-Indians because the natives are
not held to rules of equitable apportionment nor to prior appropriation to assure their
rights.").
125
See 207 U.S. 564, 565-70 (1908); Ross, supra note 124, at 199.
126
Ross, supra note 124, at 199; see also Winters, 207 U.S. at 576 ("It was the policy of the
government, it was the desire of the Indians, to change those habits and to become a
pastoral and civilized people.").
127
Ross, supra note 124, at 199.
128
See id.; General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 amended by 25
U.S.C. § 331 (repealed 2000) (equalizing allotments in the 1887 Act so that each Indian
received the same amount of land, depending on whether the land was used for grazing or
farming).
129
Winters, 207 U.S. at 565.
130
See id. at 565-67. The government's position was very unpopular with non-Indians,
and the Court's decision was instantiy controversial. See SHURTS, supra note 66, at 7 ("Many
westerners who were affected by or heard about the Winters decisions expressed outrage at
what one labeled a 'monstrous' doctrine."). Burton notes that the government's position
in Winters was aligned with President Roosevelt's commitment to use "every means at his
command to shield federally owned resources from private local exploitation." BURTON,
supra note 122, at 33.
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ernment sued because the remaining water was insufficient to support
31
the tribes' transformation to an agrarian economy
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which held that
the federal government had, with the establishment of the Fort Belknap Reservation, created an implied reserved right to any unappro13 2
priated water necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.
The Court inferred that intent based on the impossibility of fulfilling
the reservation's purpose without sufficient water to convert otherwise
133
arid, useless land into agricultural land:
We realize that there is a conflict of implications, but that which
makes for the retention of the waters is of greater force than that
which makes for their cession. The Indians had command of the
lands and the waters-command of all their beneficial use, whether
kept for hunting, "and grazing roving herds of stock," or turned to
agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this?
Did they reduce the area of their occupation and give up the waters
134
which made it valuable or adequate?
Answering these rhetorical questions in the negative, the Court reasoned that while the Indians did not specifically receive these rights
when the land was reserved for their use, the rights were implied in
the tribes' favor because all ambiguities under treaties must be resolved in favor of the Indians.1 35 Since "water was an absolute necessity" to fulfill the reservation's purposes, the Court found it was
"reserved appurtenant to the land." 136
[I] t would be extreme to believe that within a year Congress destroyed the reservation and took from the Indians the consideration
of their grant, leaving them a barren waste-took from them the
131
See Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 121, at 450. "At the time of [the Winters]
trial, the Indians were also diverting water for irrigation, most of which they began using
after the appropriative rights of non-Indians vested under state law." Id.; see also Winters,
207 U.S. at 566 (noting that federal Indian agents on the reservation began diverting water
for their domestic and irrigation needs ten years before tribal members began diverting
water to irrigate 30,000 acres of arid land). Although "some debate" exists over when nonIndians started to divert water from the river, "[t]he importance of the Court's decision is
clear; no diversions occurred before the establishment of the reservation, and the reserved
water was removed from that allocable under state law." Taiawagi Helton, Comment, Indian Reserved Water Rights in the Dual-System State of Oklahoma, 33 TULSA L.J. 979, 987 n.90
(1998).
132
See Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.

133

See id.

Id. at 576.
See id. at 576-77.
136
Ross, supra note 124, at 199; see also Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 121, at 451
("The supposition that the tribes had given up most of their land and kept their reservations without the water to develop 'agriculture and the arts of civilization' was simply not
credible to the Court." (quoting Winters, 207 U.S. at 576)).
134
135
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means of continuing their old habits, yet did not leave them the
13 7
power to change to new ones.
The Court enjoined the prior appropriators, even though they
were "first in time," because the priority date for the tribes was the
date on which the reservation was created, May 1, 1888.138 The tribes,
therefore, had senior water rights, "even though no water had then
been put to actual use" by them.1 39 The Court also rejected the prior
1 40
appropriators' argument, based on the Equal Footing doctrine,
that Montana's act of admission "repealed" any reservation the tribes
had by virtue of their treaties with the United States, if the consequence of those treaty-based rights was to remove the water of the
Milk River from potential prior appropriation by the citizens of Montana. 14 1 The Court summarily responded that the government's
power "to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation
42
under state laws is not denied, and could not be.'
The Winters Court was less clear about the scope of the reserved
water right they had declared in the favor of the tribes. 14 3 Later, the
14 5
Court in Arizona v. California (Arizona ),144 after affirming Winters,
created the standard for quantifying the amount of water reserved
under the Winters doctrine when the primary purpose of the reservation was agricultural: the amount of water reserved was the amount of
water necessary to irrigate irrigable lands' 46 (the "practicably irrigable
acreage" or PIA standard147 ). This controversial standard is still in
effect today. 148 The Arizona I Court also extended Winters's reach beWinters, 207 U.S. at 577.
See id.
139
Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 121, at 451.
See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223 (1845) (finding that a state admitted to the
140
Union "succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain" that
the original thirteen states possessed). On the interplay of Indian claims to submerged
lands and the Equal Footing doctrine, see Frank W. DiCastri, Comment, Are All States Really
Equal? The "EqualFooting" Doctrine and Indian Claims to Submerged Lands, 1997 Wis. L. REv.
179 (1997).
141
Winters, 207 U.S. at 577-78.
142
Id. at 577. The Court also declined to reach the federal government's riparian
ights argument because its interpretation of the agreement between the tribes and the
government made doing so unnecessary. See id. at 578.
143
See Winters, 207 U.S. at 577 (stating that the government reserved such water rights
"for a use which would be necessarily continued through years").
144
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
145
See id. at 599-600.
146
See id. at 601 (noting "that the only feasible and fair way by which reserved water for
the reservations can be measured is irrigable acreage" and not the number of Indians and
their reasonably foreseeable needs).
147
Chambers & Echohawk, Indian Reserved Water Rights, supra note 121, at 453 (noting
that the PIA standard is "based on the assumption that the future needs of the Indians will
be to irrigate all irrigable reservation lands") (emphasis added)).
148
Many commentators criticize the PIA standard, questioning whether it is appropriate, let alone equitable, as it favors large land-holding reservations and restricts tribes to
137
138
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yond Indian reservations, applying it to all public lands reserved after
statehood, and reaffirmed that state ownership of riverbeds under the
Equal Footing doctrine did not bar the federal reservation of water.149
The immediate impact of the Winters decision on the amount of
water tribes actually received was negligible. During the fifty-year period following the decision, the United States' policy was to "encourag[e] the settlement of the West" through "large irrigation
projects... on streams that flowed through or bordered Indian Reser150
vations" and "the creation of family-sized farms on its arid lands.'
As a result, the government ignored its duty as trustee for the tribes to
prosecute water rights on their behalf.1 5 1 Even today, Winters water
1 52
rights are difficult for tribes to obtain.

using water only for irrigation, thus preventing them from marketing the water or using it
for mineral development or tourism. See, e.g., Eric F. Spade, Comment, Indian Reserved
Water Rights Doctrine and the Groundwater Question, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 403, 420 (1994)
(suggesting that the PIA standard illustrates the disconnect between the Supreme Court's
application of prior policy that favored "assimilating the Indians into a pastoral people"
and the "current federal policy of self-determination").
149
See 373 U.S. at 597-98 (explaining that Pollard "involved only the shores of and
lands beneath navigable waters" and therefore does not limit the United States' authority
"to regulate navigable waters under the Commerce Clause and . . . government lands
under Art. IV, § 3").
150
NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 474-75 (1973); see also
Getches, supra note 43, at 415 & n.74 (non-Indian operators farm approximately 63% of
Indian farmland, generate 69% of the income from such land, and use 78% of irrigated
reservation lands as a result of the allotment program).
151
See NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 150, at 475 ("In the history of the United
States Government's treatment of Indian tribes, its failure to protect Indian water rights for
use on the Reservations it set aside for them is one of the sorrier chapters."); see also BURTON, supra note 122, at 21 (suggesting that the failure to honor tribal reserved water rights
in early planning for federal reclamation projects and instream apportionment was "unfortunate," and that "all parties concerned are now paying the price for that inattention");
Membrino, supra note 8, at 13-14 ("[T]urmoil over the McCarran Amendment decisions
is about the political and economic power that the reserved rights doctrine represents
1..
for Indian tribes, and the competition for that power from the non-Indian community that
has resulted from federal policies which encouraged non-Indians and Indians to rely on
the same water sources.").
152 See Amundson, supra note 120, at 16-17 (describing tribes' use of alternatives to
Winters rights, such as treaty-based fishing rights and Endangered Species Act claims, to
ensure sufficient water to support aquatic life); Peter Capossela, Indian Reserved Water Rights
in the Missouri River Basin, 6 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCESJ. 131, 144-47 (2002) (discussing criticisms that Indians have of the McCarran Amendment proceedings and the federal
government's conflicting interests relating to the issue of Indian water rights); cf Cobell v.
Norton, 229 F.R.D. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Alas, our 'modern' Interior department has time
and again demonstrated that it is a dinosaur-the morally and culturally oblivious handme-down of a disgracefully racist and imperialist government that should have been buried
a century ago, the last pathetic outpost of the indifference and anglocentrism we thought
we had left behind.").
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The Basic Features of Indian Reserved Water Rights

In brief, the Winters doctrine holds that when land is set aside for
Indian tribes, whether by treaty, executive order, or statute, implicit
with that reservation is the allotment of sufficient water from unappropriated sources to fulfill the purposes of the reservation. 153 Beginning
with Winters, federal and state courts have almost universally agreed
that the purpose of Indian reservations is to provide places where
tribes can sustain themselves. a54 In most cases, the tribes are entitled
55
to the amount of water necessary to irrigate irrigable lands.'
A Winters right arises from the creation of a reservation, or even
earlier if the right is based on an aboriginal use. 15 6 The tribe cannot
lose or diminish the right through nonuse or abandonment. 15 7 The
federal government "holds title to the right in trust for the benefit of
the Indians."'158 The right does not depend on state law for its existence, or on state process for its perfection, though Winters rights are
generally adjudicated in state administrative proceedings. 159
153
See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77; Royster, supra note 6, at 174. Winters rights are not
restricted to water appurtenant to a reservation or that runs through it. See Helton, supra
note 131, at 989; CharlesJ. Meyers, FederalGroundwaterRights: A Note on Cappaert v. United
States, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 388 (1978) (arguing that because "[e]quitable title to
the groundwater passed to the tribe[s] in precisely the same manner as tide passed to the
land and its other resources" when land was set aside for the tribes, there was no need to
prove federal intent to reserve groundwater for the tribes); Royster, supra note 5, at 68-69.
154
See Royster, supra note 6, at 175 ("Every court that has decided the issue has agreed
on one purpose for all reservations: the creation of an agrarian and settled society.").
155
See Arizona v. California (Arizona 1), 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) (stating that "the only
feasible and fair way by which reserved water for the reservations can be measured is irrigable acreage"); see also Spade, supra note 148, at 441 (noting that "[q]uantification is simply
a means of dragging Indian water rights into prior appropriation legal systems," and concluding that quantification and the McCarran Amendment "have diminished the [Winters]
doctrine's importance").
156
See Royster, supra note 5, at 70-71 (stating that "if a tribe was using water in its
aboriginal territory prior to the creation of a reservation and those uses were confirmed by
the treaty, agreement, or executive order creating the reservation, the water fights continue with a 'time immemorial' priority date").
157
See Membrino, supra note 8, at 2.
158
Id.; see also Ross, supra note 124, at 209 (noting that the Winters doctrine, under
which "the federal government took title to all water rights appurtenant to Indian lands
was based on a myth-that the native peoples had not established any prior legal rights to
water").
159
Although the federal government and the tribes have argued that federal Indian
law should insulate tribes from state jurisdiction over their water rights as it has in other
areas of Indian life, and that state administrative agencies were generally hostile toward the
tribes' legal claims, the Supreme Court held, in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona,
that the McCarran Amendment allows state courts to hear Indian water rights claims. See
463 U.S. 545, 564 (1983). The Court expressed its misgivings about its decision, however,
warning that "any state-court decision alleged to abridge Indian water rights protected by
federal law can expect to receive. . . a particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate
with the powerful federal interest in safeguarding those rights from state encroachment."
Id. at 571; see also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
809-13 (1976) (concluding that the McCarran Amendment applied to tribal reserved
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Judith Royster identifies four "fundamental principles" of Indian
reserved water rights. 160 First, the establishment of Indian reservations "implicitly reserves for the use of the tribe that amount of water
which is needed to fulfill the purposes for which the land was set
aside."' 61 While courts almost unanimously agree that Indian reservations were established to create "an agrarian and settled society," they
differ as to possible other purposes of these reserved lands.' 62 Second, the reserved right of tribes "to continue pre-existing or aboriginal practices such as fishing, hunting, gathering, and historical
agriculture . . . implicitly reserves as well sufficient water to support"
those activities. 163 Such aboriginal water uses predate the formation
of reservations and are considered to have "exist[ed] as of time immemorial."1 64 Third, tribal reserved water rights are, "as a matter of federal Indian .law, . . . paramount over subsequent state-law water
rights."1 65 Royster finds support for this proposition in the Interstate
and Indian Commerce Clauses and the Property Clause of the Constitution, which individually and collectively give the federal government
plenary power over Indian water rights. 166 As such, Indian water
rights are protected from interference by later non-Indian use, and
167
are "reserved in perpetuity" unless Congress extinguishes them.
water rights and that these rights present federal questions subject to Supreme Court review); Royster, supra note 5, at 93 (noting how Wyoming's Supreme Court in In re General
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System (Big Horn 1) "explicitly
noted ... that the [state) engineer was not empowered to regulate reserved rights under
state law, but rather to enforce reserved rights as determined by federal law," including
tribal reserved water rights).
160
Royster, supra note 6, at 173 (stating that these principles "transcend the state law
water rights systems").
161
Id. at 174.
162
Id. at 175-76; see also infta Part II.C.1.
163
Id. at 176; see also infra Part IV.C.2.
164
Id. at 176; see also United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Such
water rights necessarily carry a priority date of time immemorial. . . . [T] he treaty confirmed the continued existence of these rights."). Royster also notes that some Indian
water rights law scholars disagree as to whether Winters, "which held that water rights implicitly accompany the reservation of land" by the federal government, or United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), "which held that the reservation of aboriginal practices implicitly reserves as well those rights necessary to the accomplishment of the practices," is
the source of "aboriginal-practice water rights," but "[r]egardless of the precise basis of
aboriginal-practice water rights.., a tribal reservation of the right to continue pre-existing
practices implicitly reserves sufficient water to ensure that the practices in fact continue."
Royster, supra note 6, at 177-78.
165

Id. at 182.

Id. at 179-81; see also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) ("Reservation of water rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause, which permits federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Property Clause, which permits federal regulation of
federal lands." (citations omitted)).
167
Royster, supra note 6, at 181-82; see also Getches, supra note 43, at 419 n.86
166

("[O]utright extinguishment of tribal property rights held pursuant to treaty or statute
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Fourth, Indian reserved water rights survive nonuse. 168 Royster notes
that fairness drives this principle; since most Indians had neither the
resources nor the government support necessary to develop their
water rights, if these rights had lapsed due to a lack of use, they
"would have had little meaning" when recognized.1 69
The fact that tribal reserved water rights originate from the establishment of a reservation (or earlier if an aboriginal use right is
claimed) significantly differentiates these rights from appropriative
rights, which have as a priority date the first time the water is put to a
beneficial use. 170 Tribal reserved water rights are therefore senior to
most other rights in the West and can theoretically arise at any time to
defeat (or reduce the priority status of) a vested water right under the
prior appropriation system. 17 1 All of these factors make the existence
of tribal water rights potentially destabilizing and a source of
72
contention.1
C.

Some Potentially Troubling Limitations on Winters Rights

Although Winters rights offer tribes an opportunity to secure
water to sustain themselves on their reserved lands, there are two unresolved issues that may lessen the value of the right: whether the reserved water can be used for nonagricultural purposes and whether
the water can be transferred off-reservation. Unless these issues are
resolved in the tribes' favor, Winters rights may be more ephemeral
than actual.

(e.g., extinguishment of reserved water rights, hunting and fishing rights, etc.) gives rise to
claims for compensation for fifth amendment takings.").
168
See Royster, supra note 6, at 183.
169
170

Id. at

183.

See supra Part I.B.
171
See Arizona v. California (Arizona 1), 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963) (describing tribal
reserved water rights as "'present perfected rights' ... entitled to priority"); see also United
States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 327 (9th Cir. 1956) ("Indians were
awarded the paramount right regardless of the quantity [of water] remaining for the use of
white settlers."); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 832-35 (9th Cir. 1908) (holding that the Blackfeet Nation's reserved rights to the waters bordering their reservation
extended to present and future water needs, even though the exercise of such rights might
harm existing water users).
172
Wilkinson lists several reasons why dealing with water in Indian country is extremely difficult, including the following: the need to negotiate water rights with not only
federal and state governments but also with tribal governments, the "anomal[ous]" nature
of Indian water rights within the prior appropriation system, the varied "land ownership
pattern[s]" within a particular reservation, the unique "Indian cultural and religious attitudes toward the land and water," and "racism." Wilkinson, supra note 121, at 396-98.
Each of these factors is almost nonexistent in the East.
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The Purposesfor Which Tribes May Use Winters Rights

A major unresolved issue in both Winters and Arizona I was
whether tribes can use their reserved water solely for agricultural purposes, or whether the "practicably irrigated agriculture" standard
merely quantifies the amount of water tribes can use, without restricting its use to agriculture. Though the Court in Arizona Iclearly stated
that the PIA standard was only "the means of determining quantity of
adjudicated water rights but shall not constitute a restriction of the
usage of them to irrigation or other agricultural application,"1 7 3 subsequent decisions by lower federal and state courts have generated considerable confusion over whether a tribe may use its reserved water for
nonagricultural purposes, such as stockwatering and domestic uses, or
174
traditional purposes, such as hunting and fishing.
For example, the Ninth Circuit in Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton (Walton 1) held that tribes may determine how to use their allotted water and that the use at issue chosen by the tribes, fishing, was
"consistent with the general purpose for the creation of an Indian reservation," which was to create "a homeland for the survival and growth
of the Indians and their way of life."' 1 75 As Royster points out, restricting water use to agricultural purposes would compel tribes "to conform to late nineteenth century views of what was best for the
Indians."1 76 In contrast, the Wyoming Supreme Court narrowly construed language in the Wind River Reservation treaty as limiting the
purpose of the reservation to encouraging agricultural activities and
Arizona v. California (Arizona I), 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979).
See Royster, supra note 5, at 72 (arguing that lower federal and state court delineations of a reservation's purpose "depend upon the courts' willingness to interpret federal
intentions broadly or narrowly").
175
647 F.2d 42, 47-49 (9th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp.
1, 5-6 (E.D. Wash. 1982) (affirming the magistrate judge's grant to the tribe of a minimum
stream flow to maintain a certain water temperature in order to preserve the native trout
habitat historically fished by the tribe), affd in part and rev'd in part on othergrounds, United
States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
176
Royster, supra note 5, at 79; see also In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River System (Big Horn Il), 835 P.2d 273, 288 (Wyo. 1992) (Brown,
J., dissenting on this point) ("The effect of the majority determination is to make marginal
farmers out of the Tribes forever. This defeats the purposes for which the Reservation was
created."); Getches, supra note 43, at 411-12 (arguing that in contrast to other federal
reservations, Indian reservations have a broader purpose in that "virtually every reservation
was intended to be a home where Indians could be self-governing and economically selfsustaining," thus suggesting "an implied reservation ... for any productive activity on an
Indian reservation, including agricultural, mining, and recreational enterprises, as well as
sustaining fish and wildlife and natural vegetation that support traditional pursuits"). But
see Richard B. Collins, The Future Course of the Winters Doctrine, 56 CoLo. L. REv 481, 491-92
(1985) (finding it unlikely that courts will award Indians water based on the so-called
"homeland" argument-that anything that makes a reservation more prosperous isa water
use recognized under Winters-because some of those uses, such as mineral development
or water skiing reservoirs, would have been impossible to predict, are too destabilizing of
other established uses, and would require the transfer of water rights, itself an open issue).
173
174
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held that tribes did not have an "'unfettered right' to use their PIAbased water rights for other than agricultural uses.'

177

Although the

state's highest court refused to recognize a fisheries purpose for the
reservation because the tribes did not historically depend on fishing,
it recognized that agricultural purposes encompassed stockwatering as
well as municipal, domestic, and commercial uses. 178 Other courts
have found that tribal reserved water rights can be used for fisheries
purposes.

179

A related question is whether reserved tribal water rights can be
water quality on a reservation. Royster says this issue is
used to protect
"unresolved."1 8 0 She suggests that if a specific quality of water is required to fulfill a purpose of the reservation, then the "Winters doctrine would seem to dictate that the tribal water right includes a right
to quality as well as quantity."'' 1 For example, maintaining a fishery
for tribal purposes requires a certain water quality to sustain the live
fish. Similarly, water for irrigation, stockwatering, and domestic uses
also requires a certain level of purity. At least one district court has
177
Royster, supra note 5, at 79 (quoting Big Horn Il, 835 P.2d at 278). See generally id.
at 79-81 (discussing the Wyoming Supreme Court's ruling in greater detail); id. at 79
n.106 (citing various articles critical of the Big Horn III decision); Mead, supra note 60, at
453 (criticizing the Big Horn adjudication because "the state's returns from its substantial
outlay of money will be minimal and of little consequence to state appropriated rights").
178
See Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 275. Royster notes that the Big Horn litigation involved
an attempt by the tribes to change the use of the water they had been awarded from "the
consumptive purpose of irrigation to the non-consumptive use of instream flow" for fisheries preservation and that "most courts" would find such a change permissible, although a
change from a nonconsumptive use to a consumptive one is generally disallowed. Royster,
supra note 5, at 81.
179
See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
treaty creating the reservation gave the tribe the right to water to support agriculture,
hunting, and fishing on the reservation with a priority date of time immemorial); see also
State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754, 764 (Mont.
1985) (citing "water reserved for hunting and fishing" as examples of aboriginal water
rights that last into perpetuity); Stephen H. Suagee, A Tribal Strategy Increases Streamflows to
Restore a Facility, NAT. RES. & ENVr., Winter 1995, at 23, 23 (describing how the Hoopa
Valley Tribe used its reserved water rights, combined with the expertise of fish biologists, a
hydrologist, and their attorney, to reverse federal policy favoring out-of-basin transfers of
water from the Trinity River over the maintenance of the river's salmon and steelhead
populations).
Royster, supra note 5, at 85. But see FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
180
LAw 587 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK] (stating
that "Indian reserved water rights probably are protected against impairment of water quality as well as diminutions in quantity . . . [because i]t is difficult to draw a meaningful
distinction between quantity and quality of water for purposes of the Winters doctrine").
181 Id. at 85-86 (pointing out that "irrigation and fisheries protection require water of
adequate quality for the intended uses"); see also United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation
Dist., 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1448 (D. Ariz. 1996) (awarding a tribe an injunction to protect its
water rights from "material degradation"), affd, 117 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997); Spade, supra
note 148, at 441 n.297 ("Theoretically, in riparian doctrine states Indian tribes could use
the Winters doctrine to claim a right to clean water to stop or prevent upstream pollution
or groundwater contamination, or to recover damages caused by contaminated water.").
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held that a tribe "had a right to a sufficient quantity of water to keep
[a stream's] water temperature" at a level that would not "endanger
182
the native fish population."
Restricting the uses to which a tribe can put its reserved water will
inhibit the tribe's economic growth and keep it mired in a past way of
life the tribe might not have chosen for itself.183 Since the purposes
behind the establishment of eastern reservations are similar to those
supporting the establishment of western reservations, if a court was
inclined to interpret those purposes narrowly, it might similarly limit
an eastern tribe's water uses. Therefore, unless this issue is resolved in
the tribes' favor, tribes will not realize the full value of their Winters
rights.
2.

Can Winters Rights Be Transferred?

Another unresolved issue is whether Indian reserved rights can
be transferred in order to broach the possibility of a market in tribal
water rights. 184 Allowing tribes to transfer their rights off-reservation
until they have the capacity to use them on their reservations would
provide them with "a prompt economic return from their water
rights." 1 85 The revenues from water marketing would benefit tribes

economically. Non-Indian users of water would also benefit, because
182
Royster, supra note 5, at 85, n.144 (citing United States v. Anderson, 6 Indian L.
Rep. F-129, F-130 (E.D. Wash. 1979); cf United States v. Washington (Phase II), 506 F.
Supp. 187, 208 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (holding that the "correlative duty imposed upon the
State (as well as the United States and third parties) is to refrain from degrading the fish
habitat to an extent that would deprive the tribes of their moderate living needs"), affd in
part and revd in part on other grounds, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (remanding to the
district court for further fact finding). The tribes in these cases took the position that
previously recognized fishing rights entitled them to a sufficient flow of clean water to
provide for an adequate fishing habitat. See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
183
Royster and others have suggested that tribes might assuage their concern that the
Winters doctrine will not give them enough water to grow economically by claiming, in
addition, riparian rights under state law. See, e.g., Royster, supra note 5, at 102 ("In addition to Winters rights, tribes may also be able to assert state-law riparian rights to water for
additional purposes not covered by their reserved rights.").
184
Some critics argue that "[t]reating water . . . solely as an economic good . . .
[means] access may be determined based purely upon market forces, without regard to
equity or need." Erik B. Bluemel, Comment, The Implications ofFormulatinga Human Right
to Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 963 (2004).
185
Royster, supra note 5, at 83 ("Once tribal water rights are quantified, tribes are
often not able to put the water to immediate use. Water projects and delivery systems are
seldom in place and are prohibitively expensive for most tribes to construct without federal
financial assistance."). Royster notes that those who oppose allowing tribes to transfer
their water rights off-reservation are generally the same individuals who benefit from those
rights. See id. ("Opponents of tribal water marketing generally argue that it will decrease
water available to state users or make the water too expensive, but in the absence of water
marketing state appropriators have free use of a valuable tribal resource."). But see Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 121, at 466 (explaining state resistance to tribal water marketing on the grounds that "it threatens to disrupt formal or informal interstate allocations of
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water could go to the most economically valuable use. Multiple barriers-legal, practical, and political-exist, however, to allowing tribes
to market their water. If tribes cannot overcome these barriers, the
value of a tribe's Winters rights is lessened.
As a starting proposition, since a water appropriation is a property right, any change in tribal ownership of water will probably re186
quire congressional approval under the Indian Nonintercourse Act.
Congress has historically approved on-reservation transfers of water
rights, generally through the medium of a lease, but off-reservation
transfers of these rights are more politically charged.18 7 Even if tribes
could win the political and legal right to transfer water off-reservation,
few water delivery systems exist on reservations because tribes lacked,
and continue to lack, the economic wherewithal to construct such systems and because the federal government spent most of its resources
on water projects for the benefit of non-Indians to encourage western
18 8
settlement.
There are other barriers as well. For example, allowing the transfer of water off-reservation contradicts the underlying premise of
those rights, which is to sustain Indians on their reserved land. 189 Additionally, the "undecreed, unquantified, and undeveloped"' 9 0 nature
of tribal reserved water rights renders them not easily altered into a
transferable commodity. This situation is unlikely to change, given
the longstanding belief of non-Indians that they possess "the ecowater, and because a tribe-by leasing unused water to a legally junior user-might upset
the existing order of priorities under state law systems").
186 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000) ("No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands,
or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into
pursuant to the Constitution.").
187 See Royster, supra note 5, at 82 ("While Congress has given general consent to onreservation transfers of tribal water rights to lessees of Indian lands, there is some uncertainty concerning off-reservation transfers."); see also Capossela, supra note 152, at 140-41
(briefly discussing water marketing and stating that it requires the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, but that "there has been ambivalence on the issue of water marketing
at the Department" because of the Secretary's conflicting duties to "both Indians and nonIndians").
188 See Capossela, supra note 152, at 138 ("Indian water issues remained inchoate for
more than half a century after [Winters], largely because few federally funded irrigation
projects were constructed for Indians ... [and t]he United States was far more interested
in encouraging non-Indian settlement than it was in developing and protecting Indian
water resources.").
189 See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-577 (1908); see also Royster, supra
note 5, at 71 ("Under the Winters doctrine, water rights are reserved in order to carry out
the government's purpose in creating the reservation."); Royster, supra note 6, at 174
("The first fundamental principle of tribal reserved water rights is that when Indian country is established, that act implicitly reserves for the use of the tribe that amount of water
which is needed to fulfill the purposes for which the land was set aside.").
190
Membrino, supra note 8, at 25.

2006]

RESERVED INDIAN WATER RIGHTS

1233

nomic and political power to keep tribal water rights in that condi19 2
tion,"'19 1 thereby enabling non-Indians to use that water freely.
While some impediments to marketing reserved tribal water are
restricted to the West and the prior appropriation system, economic
and political constraints to such initiatives could occur in the East as
well. For example, if the reserved right is viewed as a property right
under common law or regulated riparianism, 193 then the Indian
Nonintercourse Act may also pose a problem for eastern tribes.' 9 4 A
potentially greater problem exists under both riparian systems, however, in the form of the ban on transferring water out-of-basin.1 9 5 Until legislatures pass laws removing this restriction, Indians, like nonIndians, will not be able to reap the full economic benefits of water
marketing.
Winters rights, in theory, ensure sufficient water for tribes to sustain themselves on land the federal government set aside for them.
Although Winters rights take precedent over appropriated water rights,
usually because of the date upon which they arise, the limitations on
the actual use of Winters rights lessen their value. Limitations aside,
eastern tribes are unlikely to receive the water they need to sustain
themselves unless they can assert Winters rights. The low likelihood
that a tribe could successfully assert a claim of unreasonable use or
actual damage against a competing common law riparian indicates
the importance of Winters rights. In a regulated riparian jurisdiction,
the tribe would also have to overcome that system's preference for
grandfathered uses and exemptions. The Article next turns to
whether Winters rights can be asserted in the East.

191

Id.

192 See id. According to Membrino, since water marketing is economically sensible for
both Indians and non-Indians, "[t]he objection to Indian water marketing makes sense
only as a means to divest Indians of their rights ... [and] assumes that Indian water resources are an obstacle to economic development so long as they remain in Indian ownership." Id. at 28.
193

See, e.g., COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 180, at 576 ("Indian reserved water rights

are property rights that are predicated on federal law and are not dependent on state
substantive law."); Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 121, at 454 (describing reserved Indian rights as "vested property right[s] with proprietary components-early priority date,
preservation despite non-use, and a measure as being sufficient to satisfy future beneficial
needs of the Indians").
194
See Royster, supra note 5, at 82 (noting that if reserved tribal water is a property
right, then under the Indian Nonintercourse Act it "may not be alienated or encumbered
without congressional authorization"). Royster believes that this "restriction likely extends
to tribal water rights." Id.
195 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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III
WILKINSON'S "SHADow BODY OF LAW" 1 9 6 IN THE EAST

Traditionally, western federally recognized tribes have asserted
reserved tribal water rights under state-administered prior appropriation systems. Although no tribe has asserted Winters rights in the
East,1 9 7 there are three compelling reasons for their recognition in
that part of the country. First, the Winters doctrine's origins are entwined with riparian law, particularly regulated riparianism. Second,
there are normative reasons, including redress for wrongs done to Indians throughout the history of the United States, distributive justice,
and basic notions of fairness and environmental justice, which suggest
that allocating eastern tribes reserved water rights is the just thing to
do. Finally, strong utilitarian reasons also support granting eastern
tribes reserved water rights, including the fact that since the tribes'
dependence on water for their cultural survival requires that water be
left instream for the maintenance of native fisheries, granting such
rights will encourage water conservation and benefit the environment.
A.

Winters Fits Comfortably into a Riparian Regime for
Managing Water

There are several arguments for why Winters rights should fit
within a riparian system. First, reserved tribal water rights were asserted in Winters as riparian rights. Therefore, the two types of rights
must have initially been compatible. Second, recognizing Winters
rights in a riparian system would be no more disruptive than in a prior
appropriation system, since they contain elements of both systems.
Third, given the adaptability of water management systems to changing circumstances and needs, Winters rights could easily be fit into either a common law riparian or regulated riparian system. Finally, the
factors that led to the development of the Winters doctrine in the West
also exist today in the East.
First, the Winters doctrine was originally framed in terms of riparian use rights. Although legal scholars disagree about the status of
riparian law in Montana at the time Winters arose in the federal court
system, 198 or decry the wrong-headedness of the government lawyer
196

Wilkinson, supra note 59, at 54-55 (referring to the Winters doctrine as "a shadow
body of law").
197 See Royster, supra note 5, at 101 (describing the Seminole Tribe's settlement of its
water claim before a Florida court could rule on the issue).
198
Compare Hundley, supra note 116, at 24 ("While many attorneys and legal scholars
argued that prior appropriation was the fundamental water law of Montana, others insisted
that riparian principles applied there as well."), and SHURTS, supra note 66, at 7 (noting
that "the prior appropriation system itself was not nearly as dominant, or universally supported, or as productive of desired outcomes as has been supposed"), with David H.
Getches, The Unsettling of the West: How Indians Got the Best Water Rights, 99 MICH. L. Ruv.
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who argued the case, no one disputes that Carl Rasch, the Assistant
U.S. Attorney, made riparianism the centerpiece of his legal
argument.19 9
Rasch must have thought that since the tribes' reservation abutted the Milk River, either the federal government on behalf of the
tribes or the tribes themselves could claim a riparian right to the reasonable flow of water past the reservation. By basing his claim to water
on the riparian doctrine, as opposed to the prior appropriation doctrine, Rasch avoided the evidentiary weakness in his case on the issue
of whether the tribes had used the water prior to the upstream appropriators. 20 0 He also might have believed that if he had prevailed, a
future court would have found other tribes' need for water reasonable
without having to engage in an evidentiary battle over who used the
water first.
Further, if Winters rights work in the West, where the doctrine is
virtually incompatible with the prior appropriation system, 20 1 the
rights should afortiorifunction in riparian jurisdictions, where the fit
is better. The basic features of federal reserved water rights are the
1473, 1481 (2001) (reviewingJOHN SHURTS, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS
DOCTRINE IN ITS SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT, 1880s-1930s (2000)) ("Not only was the sun
setting on riparianism in the West as a matter of law by the early twentieth century, but
politicians and development interests spoke out zealously against it while venerating prior
appropriation."). Shurts and Hundley also disagree with Getches over the extent to which
Winters conflicted with then-extant Indian law. Compare Hundley, supra note 116, at 40
("The Winters case represented a major advance for Indians at a time when reversals for
them was the usual order of the day."), and SHURTS, supra note 66, at 5 (" Winters and the
reserved rights doctrine took shape in the shadow of, and to a great extent in opposition
to, on-going developments in Indian policy and western state water law."), with Getches,
supra, at 1474 ("Only the traditions of Indian law can explain how the Supreme Court
could so threaten to disrupt the pageantry of national expansion led by yeoman farmers
settling hostile lands."), and id. at 1493 (categorizing Winters as Indian law rather than
water law and noting that "[i]f Winters 'fits' anywhere, it is within Indian law's historical
tradition of sustaining tribal rights whether or not broader policy interests are served").
199 See SHURTS, supra note 66, at 87-88 (citing as one of four propositions on which
Rasch built his case in the U.S. Court of Appeals that the United States' traditional role as
the riparian proprietor of the Milk River gave it an "absolute right to have the waters of the
river flow down the channel of the stream to supply its requirements and necessities for
domestic and agricultural purposes upon the Indian Reservation," which Rasch believed to
be "the strongest point in the case"); see also Hundley, supra note 116, at 24 (arguing that
Rasch "broaden [ed] his legal position by alluding somewhat ambiguously to 'other rights'
possessed by the Indians and the federal government... [and] singled out riparian law as
being especially applicable since the reservation abutted the Milk River"). But see Getches,
supra note 198, at 1482 ("But Rasch must have known it was a longshot when he argued for
riparian rights in the trial and appellate courts.").
200
See Hundley, supra note 116, at 23 (noting that "Rasch lacked solid evidence for his
assertions" that the tribes had appropriated water prior to upstream users).
201
See SHURTS, supra note 66, at 6 ("The reserved rights doctrine could hardly have
conflicted more with the official elements and doctrine of the prior appropriation system ....");see also Getches, supra note 198, at 1493 (noting that "[the Winters] decision was
treated like a bombshell that did not fit in at all with the water rights trends of western
water law").
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polar opposite of the prior appropriation doctrine. 20 2 For example,
prior appropriation requires that a fixed quantity of water be diverted
from its natural source and put to some beneficial use, whereas federal reserved water rights require no diversion or prior use, are difficult to quantify because they have not yet been realized, and are
unrecorded. 20 3 Therefore, appropriators on a particular stream "cannot be assured of' either a fixed priority or quantity of water "until
reserved rights are adjudicated and quantified."' 20 4 Moreover, the priority date assigned to a diversion under the prior appropriation doctrine is the date on which it actually begins, whereas the priority date
for a reserved right is the date of reservation of the land to which it
attaches. 20 5 As a matter of federal law, 20 6 Winters rights are not depen202 See Wilkinson, supra note 121, at 396 (calling Indian reserved water fights "anomalies in the prior appropriation system"). But see Royster, supra note 6, at 173 (arguing that
"tribal water rights 'cannot be understood apart from the prior appropriation system"')
(quoting COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 180, at 576)).

203 See Mead, supra note 60, at 438 ("Reserved rights ... are by their very nature unquantified and unrecorded. State water officials administering streams in prior appropriation states have no records of the existence of reserved rights, their location, their amount,
or their priority.").
204
Id. (stating that the need to quantify reserved water rights has led to state-initiated
general stream adjudications of "drainages containing federal enclaves").
205
See Royster, supra note 5, at 70. Because the federal government established most
reservations before non-Indian appropriators attempted to establish their water rights, little water in the West is beyond the doctrine's reach. See id.; see also Getches, supra note 43,
at 410, 410 n.23 (citing New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), for the
proposition that priority dates for tribes may even be earlier than the date on which their
reservations were established). On the topic of aboriginal reserved water rights, see State
ex. rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754, 764 (Mont. 1985) (acknowledging that pre-existing tribal water uses for hunting and fishing have aboriginal
priority dates of "time immemorial" (quoting United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414
(9th Cir. 1983)));James L. Merrill, Aboriginal Water Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 45, 52 n.29
(1980); Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, Outsiders into Insiders: The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation and
Indigenous Communities in ColonialPuebla, Mexico, 23 OKLA. Crrv U. L. REv. 93, 93 (1998)
(arguing that while the prior appropriation doctrine "should have privileged indigenous
farmers with irrigation because they had a solid claim to 'ancient and peaceful' possession
of water rights," it did not); Ross, supra note 124, at 208 (contending that "archaeological
and historical evidence" indicate that southwestern tribes' "distinct and definite water-tenure systems . . . should have been recognized under doctrine of aboriginal title ....

that

they were full-fledged riparians and prior appropriators, builders of diversion works giving
full notice that the water was being put to beneficial use" and that the Winters doctrine,
which "put Indian water rights in the hands of the federal government ....
substantially
changed the quality of the rights the natives should have received under aboriginal title");
Royster, supra note 6, at 176 ("[W]hen Indian tribes reserve for themselves the right to
continue pre-existing or aboriginal practices such as fishing, hunting, gathering, and historical agriculture, whether inside their Indian country or off-reservation, that act implicitly reserves as well sufficient water to support that tribally reserved activity. These rights
exist as of time immemorial.").
206
See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983) (explaining that both state and federal courts have "a solemn obligation to follow federal law" when
adjudicating tribal water rights); see also Adair, 723 F.2d at 1411 n.19 ("The fact that water
fights of the type reserved for the Klamath Tribe are not generally recognized under state
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dent on state law systems, unlike appropriative water rights. 20 7 To the
extent that tribal reserved water rights attach to land, 20 8 are generally
not quantified or recorded unless subjected to an administrative process, and can remain in force in perpetuity, 20 9 they share some important features with common law riparian water rights. 2 10 The only

major difference between traditional riparian doctrine and reserved
water rights is that pro rata sharing is not required during water
21
shortages. 1
Furthermore, reserved tribal water rights should function well in
the East because water management systems, especially riparianism,
are inherently flexible. They reflect societal needs as such needs
come into existence, and they change as those needs evolve.2 1 2 For
example, common law riparianism has incorporated features of the
prior appropriation doctrine such as permits, an administrative bureaucracy, quantification of allotted water, and a quasi-priority system
213
in the form of exemptions grandfathering certain existing uses.

prior appropriations is not controlling as federal law provides an unequivocal source of
such rights.").
207
See Royster, supra note 6, at 192-93 (stating that "[t]ribal reserved water rights are
not appropriative rights," which are governed by state law, because they are "reserved as a
matter of federal law"). Royster also points out that equating tribal reserved water rights
with appropriative rights improperly reduces tribes to the status of "merely property owners within their reservations," when they are in fact sovereign governments whose water
rights are secured by treaties or equivalent federal agreements. Id. at 193-94.
208
See United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1939) (granting tribal water
rights to non-Indian successors-in-interest to an Indian allotment of land on the ground
that such rights attached to the land and therefore passed to them through the conveyance); Royster, supra note 6, at 192 n.115 (stating that "tribal rights arise from the reservation of land or the preservation of aboriginal uses").
209
See Royster, supra note 5, at 63 (describing some of the attributes of Indian reserved
rights and noting their "potential to disrupt state appropriation systems of water rights");
id. at 77 (commenting that "there is no standard for quantifying the instream flow right for
fisheries"); Royster, supra note 6, at 181 (stating that "the rights reserved to or by tribes
were reserved in perpetuity").
210
See, e.g., Brinton, supra note 80, at 70-71 (labeling federal reserved water rights
"federal riparianism" and noting other areas of similarity between riparian and federal
reserved water rights).
211
See Arizona v. California (Arizona 1), 373 U.S. 546, 597 (rejecting the argument that
the Winters doctrine is one of equitable apportionment); Helton, supra note 131, at 998
(arguing that "[b]ecause reserved rights are federal rights," they cannot be subordinated
to state common law rights due to the Supremacy Clause, and, therefore, during times of
water shortage, such rights must have "priority over rights perfected under state law").
212
See Rose, supra note 24, at 27 0-74 (telling the "evolutionary" story of property rights
and riparian water rights and charting the development of such rights in eastern states,
finding them neither "rigid" nor "static and antidevelopmental" but rather a reflection of
people's preferences).
213
See Royster, supra note 6, at 189-90. Royster explains that "[r]egulated riparianism... introduces into eastern state water law two of the central features of prior appropriation: quantification and some measure of temporal priority." Id. at 189. While the latter
is "not a stated feature of regulated riparianism, some degree of it is inherent in the system," as "existing uses may be exempt from permit requirements, essentially granting those
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Meanwhile, the prior appropriation doctrine is beginning to adopt
features of the eastern common law riparian regime, such as allowing
water to remain instream to protect the stream's ecology, being less
rigid about senior water rights holders' taking their full share regardless of the impact on more junior claimants, and broadening beneficial uses 2 14 to require that the allotment be in the public interest and
not ecologically damaging. 215 Even the administration of reserved tribal rights in the West has fundamentally changed the basic features of
those rights, including their approved purposes, the quantification of
2 16
reserved rights, and the assignment of a priority date.
The changes to common law riparianism as it moves toward the
prior appropriation system as well as those to reserved water rights
2 17
make Winters rights fit more easily into a regulated riparian regime.
However, integrating tribal reserved water rights into any type of riparian legal system may prove more challenging than integrating them
into pure prior appropriation systems, given the need to mesh riparianism's correlative rights principle with the "paramount and perpetual nature of tribal water rights" under the Winters doctrine. 218
uses a permanent priority over new uses." Id. at 189-90. When the water body is overdrawn, "later-proposed withdrawals may be denied or curtailed." Id. at 190.
214
"Beneficial use" is a malleable term, generally defined as "a reasonable use consistent with the public interest in the best use of water supplies." Mead, supra note 60, at 438
n.47. Whether a particular use is, in fact, beneficial "depends on the facts and circumstances of each case." Id.
215
See Wilkinson, supra note 59, at 64. "The fact that state-granted [appropriative]
water rights, even if decreed, are not as fixed and hard as commonly believed can be critical in producing water for the tribes." Id. This means that water subject to a prior appropriative right which has been "diverted but wasted" can be rediverted to tribes. Id.
Moreover, the application of good conservation practices by non-Indian users will make
more water available to fulfill the needs of tribes with reserved rights and will likely be "the
most common manner in which paper Winters rights will be reconciled with existing uses."
Id.
216
See id. at 184-85 (describing how assigning tribal water rights a priority date of
either the date on which "the land reservation was set aside" or "time immemorial" when
"water [is] reserved to preserve existing aboriginal uses and practices" and quantifying the
amount of water reserved to be that which is necessary to accomplish a specific purpose
either of the reservation or "to continue aboriginal uses" enables tribal water rights to fit
into the prior appropriation scheme).
217 See id. at 197 ("Certainly integrating tribal reserved rights into a regulated riparian
jurisdiction poses fewer administrative headaches than doing so in a common-law riparian
state."). Specifically, Royster argues that tribal reserved rights, once quantified, could be
"integrated" into a regulated riparian system by setting that amount of water, along with
the minimum instream flow, aside as being "beyond riparian use," which would "guarantee
the paramount and perpetual nature of tribal water rights and, at the same time, minimize
the burden of administering a coordinated system." Id.
218 Id. (stating that "[i]ntegrating tribal reserved rights into a workable system in a
common-law riparian jurisdiction will undoubtedly prove more difficult" because of the
need "to coordinate a set of quantified rights for tribes with a set of correlative rights for
riparian owners ... without destroying the paramount nature of those [tribal] rights, and
allowing state law to trump federal rights"). But see Gwendolyn Griffith, Note, Indian
Claims to Groundwater:Reserved Rights or Beneficial Interest?, 33 STAN. L. REv. 103, 118 (1980)
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Royster suggests "incorporat[ing] into state riparian law the doctrine
that a riparian use that interferes with a paramount tribal reserved
right is unreasonable per se" or "satisfy[ing] the tribal water right
before any riparian rights arising subsequent to the tribal right" to the
same water. 2 19 Declaring some riparian uses per se unreasonable is
not a foreign concept. Virginia, for example, does this with respect to
out-of-basin water transfers. 220 The latter would "protect[ ] the paramount nature of tribal rights," would be "consistent with the correlative nature of common-law riparian rights" because it leaves
competing riparians to allocate "the burden of any water shortage"
that might arise among themselves, 22 1 and would force later users to
demonstrate the unreasonableness of a tribe's use.
Last, given the underlying rationale for tribal reserved water
rights, these rights should be recognized in the East. The purpose
behind reserving land on which tribes can live and maintain their
traditional aboriginal practices 222 is the same regardless of where the
land is located. This purpose carries with it the implicit right to sufficient water for such reserved lands.
Winters rights have more in common with riparian water management systems than with the prior appropriation system, though they
arose in the latter and have been applied primarily in that system. The
purposes they would serve in the East are as compelling as they are in
the West. Water management systems in general, and riparian systems
in particular, are sufficiently flexible to incorporate Winters rights. Indeed, the United States government originally used riparian principles to defend these rights. In addition to these doctrinal arguments
for eastern tribes' assertion of Winters rights, equitable and utilitarian
reasons compel them to do so.

(arguing that granting Indians a "preemptive right" to groundwater is "less drastic" in riparian jurisdictions than in prior appropriation jurisdictions because riparian water rights
are accompanied by a duty to allow other overlying landowners reasonable use"; therefore, "unlike the junior appropriator in prior appropriation states, the investor [in a riparian jurisdiction] does not face extinguishment of her investment by Indian preemptive
rights unless the Indians' reasonable use exhausts all the water in an aquifer").
Royster, supra note 6, at 197-98.
219
See supra note 34.
220
Royster, supra note 6, at 198; see also Eric H. Lord, The Obed Wild and Scenic River of
221
Tennessee: Asserting a Federal Reserved Water Right in a RiparianJurisdiction,GREAT PLA-INs NAT.
RESOURCEJ., Spring 2003, at 1, 26, 28 (proposing both a "hybrid system" in which "reserved
[water] right[s] would be on a par with those riparian users ... with vested rights" and
"quiet title action[s]" to establish a "hierarchy" of rights among users of a particular
stream).
222
See In re The Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. &
Source, 35 P.3d 68, 74 (Ariz. 2001).
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Normative and Utilitarian Reasons Why the Winters Doctrine
Should Apply in the East

"Western water issues cannot be dealt with now or in the years to
come without squarely confronting the legal and moral force" of a
history that ignored Indian water rights. 2 2 3 "Questions of fairness pervade the issue of Indian water rights." 224 On one side are the farmers
and ranchers who built their homes and livelihoods in reliance on
secure water rights, which the Winters doctrine makes highly insecure. 225 On the other side are Indian tribes who unwillingly provided
the water that built the federal and state reclamation systems and supplied many of those farmers and ranchers with water, to the extreme
detriment of the tribes.
This Part of the Article, however, uses slightly different normative
arguments as a basis for recognizing the Winters doctrine in the East;
this is because of the inapplicability of arguments based on federal
water policies there. Instead, the arguments set forth below focus on
historical redress for a broad array of injuries to Indians, distributive
equity, and the government's fiduciary obligations to Indians. 22 6 In
addition, this Part explains why granting Winters rights serves utilitarian purposes because it will result not only in more water for everyone, but also in water that is purer.
1.

Normative Reasons

Liu makes the case that Indians are entitled to what she calls "historical redress" because of the "asymmetry in the development of western water resources." 22 7 She notes that federal policy favored the
development of non-Indian water projects and that "the federal gov223

Wilkinson, supra note 59, at 55.

224

Id.

For example, the upstream area at issue in Winters had been settled since 1898
under the Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976), and the Desert
Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-39
(2000)). After having acquired title to their land from the government through these Acts,
the settlers began spending a lot of money to divert water from rivers as well as build towns
with schools, roads, "and other improvements usually had and enjoyed in a civilized community." Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 569 (1908).
226
The concepts of"historical redress" and "distributive justice" come from Sylvia Liu.
Sylvia F. Liu, Comment, American Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Federal Obligation to Protect
Tribal Water Resources and TribalAutonomy, 25 ENVTL. L. 425 (1995). Liu develops normative
arguments based on Rawls's contractarian theory, general notions of tribal sovereignty,
communitarian and group-based rights, and the federal government's Indian-trust obligations to support the government's taking a more assertive role in advocating a broad interpretation of the Winters doctrine and allowing tribes to determine how to use their water.
See id.
225

227

Id. at 434-38.
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ernment did little to promote Indian water rights," 2 28 with the result
that "American Indians were by far the least active participants in the
work of Winters" in the decades following the decision. 229 The "specific relative disparity" in the government's support of "Indian tribes
and non-Indian water users," Liu posits, "compels the government to
work towards providing Indian tribes with contemporary equivalent
support and opportunities for water resource development," such as
the opportunity "to sell or export their water for off-reservation
230

use.1

To the extent that this argument rests on federal water policy, it
has little applicability in the East, where such a policy does not exist.
The federal government has not subsidized major eastern water supply projects since local financing for these probjects is more the
norm. 23 1 This does not eliminate, however, the need to redress more
general wrongs done to eastern Indian tribes at the hands of white
settlers. Since early contact with settlers, eastern tribes have been exposed to discrimination, disease (sometimes deliberately), genocide,
slavery, removal, and wars. 232 Tribes ceded land in exchange for be-

ing left unmolested by non-Indians. But over time, non-Indian encroachments onto Indian lands reduced those holdings to a mere
fraction of the land first the Crown, and then the United States, confirmed was theirs. 2 33
Additionally, the Winters doctrine arises from, and rests on, equitable principles, as illustrated by the Court's use of the Indian canon
for construing treaties in order to find a rationale for holding in favor

228 Id. at 434-36. Liu notes that the "few irrigation projects" the Bureau of Indian
Affairs began on reservations "remain largely unfinished due to insufficient funds," citing
as one example "an irrigation project on the Fort Belknap Reservation [begun] in 1903,
[which] still had not [been] completed as of March 1995." Id. at 436.
229 SHURTS, supra note 66, at 9. Shurts takes issue with the dominant story that Winters
"lay dormant until resurrected by the Supreme Court in the Arizona v. California decision in
1963, when it became a significant part of modem water disputes in the West and of the
more effective assertion of Indian sovereignty," stating that that story "obscure[s]" that
"Winters was well known and often used by lawyers, government officials, members of Congress, and others interested in water issues involving Indians and non-Indians alike." Id. at
8.
230 Liu, supra note 226, at 438.
231
For example, a consortium of cities and counties is paying for the reservoir project
the Mattaponi Tribe opposes. See Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Commonwealth Dep't
of Envd. Quality ex rel. State Water Control Bd., 621 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 2005).
232 See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of "Domestic-DependentNations" in the
Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, 2005
UTAH L. REv. 443, 542.

233 See ROUN-TREE, supra note 12, at 89 (describing the English as "Protestants... determined to acquire the land they wanted" and the Powhatan Indians as being "soon isolated
on ever-shrinking islands of tribal territory").
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of the tribes. 234 Justice McKenna showed his sensitivity to the circumstances that had led to the creation of the Fort Belknap Reservation,
which had left the tribes with less land than they had had before. He
said:
[I]t would be extreme to believe that within a year Congress destroyed the reservation and took from the Indians the consideration
of their grant, leaving them a barren waste,-took from them the
means of continuing their old 35habits, yet did not leave them the
2
power to change to new ones.
Relying on the moral force of these arguments, the Court refused to
hear the state's equal footing argument and the government's ripa23 6
rian law theories.
Unlike Liu's narrow historical redress argument, the above arguments are more consistent with traditional broad-based normative arguments that require redress for the harms done to Indians since the
settling of this country. 23 7 These arguments are also premised on the
importance of water to tribes for their survival and the fact that tribes
entered into treaties that assured them they could continue to use and
rely on this water to sustain themselves and to practice traditional culture-based activities.2 38 Even basic normative principles arising from
the notion of a bargained-for exchange between parties would impose
an obligation on non-Indians to honor that exchange. 23 9
See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) (applying an interpretive rule
234
requiring that any ambiguity in agreements and treaties "be resolved from the standpoint
of the Indians"); see also Richard B. Collins, The Future Course of the Winters Doctrine, in
INDIAN WATER, supra note 59, at 89, 90 (noting that Winters "is based on a rule of fairness
followed by the Supreme Court, not, as some of its critics charge, on an ad hoc rule created
for the Winters case," and citing the Court's "firmly established ... rule of construing Indian laws and treaties favorably to the Indians," as well as the Court's "underlying moral
principle").
235
Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
236
See Winters, 207 U.S. at 578 (reasoning that "our construction of the agreement and
its effect make it unnecessary" for the Court to respond to the petitioner's equal footing
argument and the government's riparian argument); see also Liu, supra note 226, at 460
("The nature of the Winters right is an historically remedial one, where courts imply from a
reservation of tribal land a congressional intent to have reserved enough water to benefit
the tribes and to allow them to develop fully. Given this historical context, and in light of
the troubled history of federal Indian policy, an approach that defers to the needs of nonIndian water users" would merely "repeat historical inequities.").
237
See, e.g., David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples,
38 UCLA L. REv. 759, 818 (1991) (" [B]ecause the federal government stole land and sovereignty from Indians in the past, the federal government today owes land and sovereignty to
contemporary Indians.").
238
See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576 (commenting that it is not possible that the Fort Belknap Reservation tribes would have "deliberately given up" water enabling them to subsist
on their arid lands).
239
See, e.g., Wiecking v. Allied Med. Supply Corp., 391 S.E.2d 258, 260 (Va. 1990) (stating that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has never applied to contract actions in
Virginia).
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Liu further suggests that "traditional arguments of distributional
justice" support her thesis that a "broad interpretation of Indian reserved [water] rights" is warranted. 2 40 She argues that it is iniquitous
and unjust that non-Indians have dispossessed tribes of their naturalresource base and forced them to shoulder the burdens of scarcity
disproportionate to the burdens borne by non-Indians. 241 Federal
policies have supported and enabled this disparity, which adds to the
injustice. 242 The same principle applies when state policies cause the
inequity.
If we were to accept the State's argument, we would be enshrining
the rather perverse notion that traditional rights are not to be protected in precisely those instances when protection is essential, i.e.,
when a dominant group has succeeded in temporarily frustrating
exercise of those rights. We prefer a view more compatible with the
theory of this nation's founding: rights
do not cease to exist because
243
a government fails to secure them.
These arguments are equally persuasive on the issue of applying Winters in the East.
Indians are today among the poorest people in the United States,
with reservations that "continue to rank among the most economically
depressed sectors of the nation. '24 4 Reservation Indians suffer severe
health and emotional problems, as well as "chronically high [rates of]
240

Liu, supra note 226, at 438. On the topic of environmental justice, see CLIFORD
& EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION

RECHTSCHAFFEN

(2002).
241
See Liu, supra note 226, at 438-39 (noting that water scarcity on Indian reservations
has further exacerbated Indians' economic troubles).
242
See AnnalisaJabaily, Note, Water Rites: A ComparativeStudy of the Dispossession of American Indians and Palestiniansfrom Natural Resources, 16 GEO. INT'L ENTvrL. L. REv. 225, 245
(2004). Jabaily comments on the "maldistributive impacts of [the] ideologies and practices" that removed both Indians and Palestinians from the landscape during settlement
(and persist today) and states that such ideologies and practices have "tightly circumscribed" Indian and Palestinian access to clean water. Id. She finds this "especially iniquitous" as both "had lived on [the land] and regulated the natural resources before the
creation of the State." Id. She concludes that "because the physical land and water needs
of Palestinians and American Indians exist in tense contradiction to the State ideologies
that allocate the majority of clean water to 'settlers,' the fantasy of American Indian and
Palestinian non-existence cannot forever withstand the clamor that increases with thirst."
Id.; see also Ross, supra note 124, at 209 (commenting on the "myth ...
that the native
peoples had not established any prior legal rights to water").
243
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 730 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
244 Liu, supra note 226, at 438; see also Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 121, at 448
(noting "general agreement that on Indian reservations in western states the clear disparity
between Indian and non-Indian actual water use which greatly favors non-Indians is surely
one cause of widespread poverty"); Jabaily, supra note 242, at 241 (stating that the lack of
"equal access to water" on Indian reservations "has severely impacted agricultural and domestic life" and noting that "in 1980, twenty-one percent of all Indian housing units did
not have running water or indoor toilets").
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unemployment" and illiteracy, and have few social services to mitigate
these problems.24 5 Liu finds, in applying distributive justice theories,

that the disparities between Indian and non-Indian society are sufficiently large to justify giving Indians a more favorable status than nonIndian users of water.246 Of those theories, she focuses on Rawls's
"contractarian perspective," utilitarianism, 2 47 and Jeremy Waldron's
need-based

theory.

248

Rawls's contractarian approach favors the "unequal distribution"
of "social goods" in order to "advantage . . . the least favored
group,"' 24 9 the one with the fewest "'things that every rational man is

presumed to want,' such as 'rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, [and] income and wealth.' "250 Indian tribes certainly qualify
under this definition. This theory thus justifies granting tribes, "one
of the least advantaged groups in our society, access to a primary
' 25 1
good: sufficient water to fulfill the purposes of their reservation."
Waldron suggests that "the point of view of those who suffer deprivation should guide evaluations of property arrangements."' 2 52 Kaufman expands on Waldron's theory, according to Liu, by pointing out
that "an individual's effective exercise of rights must link to a minimum standard of living, in order to guarantee the equality of what he
calls 'citizenship entitlements,'

. . .

the irreducible minimum claims to

state obligations that each citizen enjoys." 2 53 Liu uses these "needsbased" theories to support granting "tribes enough water to ensure
both ecotheir full participation in society, which arguably entails
254
nomic self-sufficiency and political self-determination."
Liu identifies, but does not rely upon, an approach to "distributive equity" that regards "American Indian water rights as uniqueproperty rights." 255 However, this argument might be availing as well.
Winters rights are indeed unique in that a treaty, executive agreement,
or act of Congress secures them. These agreements between tribes
and the federal government make tribal reserved water rights special,
complete with the moral authority of contracting sovereign nations.
245 Liu, supra note 226, at 438. Liu uses this data as a shield against those who argue
that granting tribes reserved water fights amounts to an undeserved "windfall." Id. at 439.
246

See id.

247

248

Utilitarian arguments are developed infra Part III.B.2.
See Liu, supra note 226, at 439.

249

Id. at 440 (citing JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75-83 (1971)).

Id. (quoting RAWLS, supra note 249, at 62).
Id. (applying "Rawls' own terms to interpret Winters").
Liu, supra note 226, at 441 (citingJeremy Waldron, Property,Justificationand Need, 6
CANADIAN J. L. &JURISPRUDENCE 185, 210-11 (1993)).
253 Id. (quoting ROBERT M. KAUFMAN, RIGHTS, NEEDS, AND GROUPS: TOWARDS A RECONSTRUCIION OF PHILOSOPHIC, JURISPRUDENTIAL, AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS 43, 151,
174-80 (1983)).
Id.
254
255 Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
250

251
252
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Winters rights are also unique because they are communal rights. 2 56
The importance of water to the cultural identity and self-determination of tribes and the value of preserving tribes as unique "collective
social entities" 2 57 justifies granting that water special protection. 258
Liu notes that reserved tribal water rights are critical to tribal sovereignty, a concept that includes not only "political, territorial, and
cultural autonomy," 259 but also control over land and natural resources, such as water. 260 In this sense, reserved tribal water rights
perform a unique cultural and political function for tribes, in addition
to the more ordinary economic one that water rights provide for nonIndians. Indeed, as defined in Winters, reserved rights are those rights
that are necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. 26 1 Therefore, whether a reservation is viewed as public lands or the lands of a
separate sovereign, a reservation is very different from the private
262
lands serviced by appropriative rights.
A final normative argument relies on the federal Indian trust relationship, which imposes a moral obligation on the federal government to protect tribes. 263 Originating in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,264
this trust obligation continues today and imposes upon the federal
government unique obligations on behalf of tribes. The government's
trust responsibility towards Indian tribes involves "moral obligations of
the highest responsibility and trust . . . [and] should therefore be
256
See id. at 442-46 (discussing various communitarian arguments justifying promotion of Indian tribes' rights).
257 Id. at 445; see also Babcock, supra note 232, at 538-39 (describing tribes as unique
"homogeneous communities").
258 See Liu, supra note 226, at 445.
259

Id. at 446.

260 Id. at 448-49; see also Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("Regulation of water on a reservation is critical to the lifestyle of its residents
and the development of its resources. Especially in arid and semi-arid regions of the West,
water is the lifeblood of the community.").
261
207 U.S. 564, 567 (1908).
262
See Mead, supra note 60, at 448 (noting that the "Partial Decree's grant of the entire
natural flow of [the river in Yellowstone National Park] is significant... [because it] illustrates that the federal government will not surrender these rights where their existence is
crucial to maintaining important public lands").
263 Commentators have noted the paradox, which still exists today, of the government
resting this trust responsibility in the Department of Interior, as this Department also
houses the Bureau of Reclamation, the agency bearing primary responsibility for the government policy that long ignored reserved tribal water rights. See Membrino, supra note 8,
at 20 (describing the Pyramid Lake litigation as "a paradigm of the conflict over Indian
trust resources," casting the federal trustee as "both ally and adversary of the Tribe," and
noting that "[w]hen the attempted abandonment is politically motivated, the precarious
nature of the Indian trust is manifest"); see also Capossela, supra note 152, at 144-47
(describing "federal conflicts of interest in Indian water").
264 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (describing Indian tribes as "domestic dependent
nations" and analogizing their relationship to the United States as "a ward to his
guardian").
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judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards." 265 The govern2 66
ment's responsibilities should resemble those of a private trustee.
These obligations include the duty "to litigate Indian rights." 26 7 Recently, a U.S. district court judge found that although a state engineer's action was not "contemptuous," it was sufficiently "deficient" to
prompt the court to remove the engineer from the matter and transfer the authority "to administer all water rights" on the reservation to
2 68
the tribes.
Liu persuasively argues that the federal-Indian trust relation requires the federal government to be an advocate for tribal interests,
including achieving the "maximum quantification of Indian water
rights" on the tribes' behalf, and tribal "autonomy" in determining
how tribes can use that water. 26 9 When the federal government ignores that responsibility by being either "absent or neutral" when disputes arise about reserved tribal rights, "the effect is much the same as
270
if the government were formally an adversary to the tribal interest."
All of these normative arguments resonate with eastern tribes;
their relevance does not stop at the 100th meridian. Non-Indians
have caused suffering for eastern tribes, leaving them with little of
their original homeland and in great poverty. 27 1 Eastern tribes are

therefore among Rawls's "least favored groups" and qualify for Kaufman's "citizenship entitlements," as do western tribes. Eastern tribes
265 Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
266
See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C. 1972)
(holding that fiduciary duties required the Secretary of the Interior "to formulate a closely
developed regulation that would preserve water for the Tribe ... [and] to assert his statutory and contractual authority to the fullest extent possible to accomplish this result"), rev'd
on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The district court in Pyramid Lake recognized the difficulties for the Secretary in fulfilling fiduciary obligations, but the court went
on to say that these difficulties could not "simply be blunted by a judgment call' calculated
to placate temporarily conflicting claims to precious water. The Secretary's action [in this
case] is therefore doubly defective and irrational because it fails to demonstrate an adequate recognition of his fiduciary duty to the Tribe." Id. at 256-57.
267
Capossela, supra note 152, at 147 ("The federal trust responsibility obligates the
United States to litigate Indian rights.").
268 Membrino, supra note 8, at 30-31.
269 Liu, supra note 226, at 452-58 (stating that "courts should interpret the trust relationship to require the federal government to promote Indian autonomy .. . [and] the
maximum quantification of Indian water rights"). Membrino implores Congress and the
Executive branch "to embrace the premise that treaties and agreements vest Indian tribes
with rights in western water resources for which the government has a trust responsibility"
and to recognize that " [v] igorous federal advocacy of the federal trust is essential to fair
disposition of Indian claims." Membrino, supra note 8, at 22-23. He reasons that federal
trustee advocacy of Indian reserved rights "cannot be overstated," because "[a] faithful
trustee can prevent the Indian interest from being misunderstood or undermined," or
even "overwhelm[ed]" by the non-Indian interests. Id. at 17, 21-22.
270 Membrino, supra note 8, at 23.
271
See RoUNTFREE, supra note 12, at 89 ("As each chiefdom's lands decreased, the core
Indian people became poorer.").
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could not have ceded their lands to settlers without retaining sufficient water. Water is just as essential for eastern tribes as it is for western tribes. To the extent that most eastern tribes are not federally
recognized, Part IV suggests that this lack of recognition should not
bar the imposition of fiduciary responsibilities on governing
authorities.
2.

UtilitarianReasons to Recognize Reserved Tribal Water Rights in
the East

Recognition of reserved tribal water rights will expand "the 'social pie."'

2 72

The reserved rights doctrine does not require tribes to

use their water allotment and thus perhaps waste it, which means
more water will be available for marketing or for instream use by
other people. 2 73 Additionally, since Indians consume less water than
non-Indians because traditional uses such as fishing or cultural ceremonies require that water be left in the stream, more water will remain for downstream use. 27 4 Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that

tribes would, or could, develop their water rights, as they lack the resources, technical support, and land base to do so. 275 In fact, when

tribal reserved rights have been recognized and quantified, "gallonfor-gallon reductions [in non-Indian water rights] have not occurred,
largely because the increased use of water by Indian tribes resulted
from new storage, improved water management, or exchanges and

marketing mechanisms," which have "increase [d]," not diminished,
"the aggregate welfare." 276
Furthermore, unconsumed water serves environmental purposes,
as water left in the stream supports important ecological functions
such as maintaining habitats for fish and wildlife. 277 Recognizing reserved tribal rights to water will also ensure the level of purity necessary to maintain

tribal fishing and ceremonial

uses. 2 78

These

environmental advantages benefit both Indians and non-Indians, thus
maximizing overall social welfare.
Liu, supra note 226, at 440.
See id.
See id. Non-Indians consume more water partly because of widespread and ineffi274
cient irrigation practices; for instance, 85% of the water used in the West goes toward
irrigation. See id. at 437 n.73.
275
See id. at 436 (discussing the lack of federal financial support for tribes and the
leasing of Indian lands to non-Indian farmers).
276
Id. at 440.
277
See id. (suggesting that tribes can use "water more efficiently, such as for maintaining instream flows for fisheries").
See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
278
Isleta Pueblo's water standards, which were more stringent than state standards, in order to
assure water purity for ceremonial purposes).
272

273
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There are no geographical limits to these utilitarian arguments
supporting granting western tribes Winters rights. However, the normative arguments are not unique to the West either. The Article now
addresses the principal barriers facing eastern tribes who seek to assert Winters rights: the lack of public lands and federal recognition.
IV
OVERCOMING Two BARRIERS To ASSERTING WINTERS RIGHTS
IN THE EAST

A major argument against eastern tribes asserting Winters rights is
that the doctrine's invocation depends on the existence of withdrawn
federal land or a federally recognized tribe. 279 There are three responses to this argument. The first is suggested by Royster in a footnote in her article on asserting Winters rights in riparian jurisdictions,
namely that an analogy can be drawn between federally recognized
and state-recognized tribes, and that corresponding trust responsibilities can be assigned to both governments. 28 0 While this argument
provides a theoretical basis for the assertion of Winters rights by staterecognized tribes, the argument benefits a limited number of tribes.
The theory also subjects those tribes to state law and the whimsy of
state advocacy of their rights, which may be more problematic in the
modern era than advocacy by the federal government.
The second response sidesteps any dependence on state law or
state government by suggesting that the colonial treaties of eastern
tribes entail a sufficient federal presence for the assertion of the Winters doctrine. While this response is slightly more inclusive than the
previous one, it still benefits a limited number of tribes.
The third response disputes the argument that Winters rights are
limited to withdrawn federal land or to federally recognized tribes,
finding the limitations defective for two reasons. First, Winters rights
attach to land regardless of its federal status, and second, tribal reserved water rights are aboriginal in nature, such that they predate the
federal government's withdrawal of the land. Therefore, the status of
the land and tribe are irrelevant for determining whether a tribal reserved water right exists. If this response succeeds it will benefit all
tribes, not just state recognized ones or ones with colonial treaties,
and will not be dependent on states or federalizing colonial treaties.

279 There are only fourteen eastern federally recognized tribes out of many hundreds
of recognized tribes nationwide. 67 Fed. Reg. 46328-01 (July 12, 2002).
280 See Royster, supra note 6, at 174 n.18.
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Royster's Analogy
Royster suggests that "where the state acts in the capacity of trus-

tee for state-recognized tribes,... there is no reason that state-recog-

nized tribes would not have reserved rights to water as a matter of
s Similar to a federal trustee, a state trustee
state law. 2 81
theoretically
must act in the interests of the tribe and advocate on its behalf, which
includes helping the tribe secure sufficient water to maintain its traditional way of life. There are several practical problems with this analogy, however.
The Mattaponi's experience, as a state-recognized tribe,28 2 with
Virginia illustrates some of the problems with Royster's analogy. The
Mattaponi's tribal identity is, as it has ever been, reliant upon the
river, such that the modern Tribe considers itself culturally and economically bound to the river.28 3 The Tribe depends on shad for its

subsistence, and tribal members fish the river in the same place and
manner as their ancestors and partake in religious ceremonies in the
river. The Tribe makes pottery with river mud, as its ancestors did,
and gathers native plants along the riverbanks for medicinal purposes
and food.
Since the Mattaponi's continued existence as a tribe depends
upon the water that flows by its reservation, it has fought, for over a
decade, the construction of a municipal drinking water reservoir that
would withdraw 75 million gallons of water per day from the river.
The Tribe believes the water withdrawal will change the river's salinity
and will thus disrupt the shad's annual spawn and reduce native
plants. Furthermore, the reservoir will flood the Tribe's nearby ancestral homelands.
If the Mattaponi were a federally recognized tribe or occupied
federal lands, it could claim a reserved water right to sustain its treatyprotected traditional uses of the river.2 8 4 Although the Mattaponi are
neither federally recognized nor occupy federal lands, given the
Tribe's dependence on the Mattaponi River for its subsistence and
cultural identity, it is highly unlikely that the Tribe intended to cede
281

Id; see also 1 Va. Op. Att'y Gen. 107, 108 (1977) ("Opinions of this Office have

recognized a guardian-ward relationship between the Commonwealth and the Mattaponi

and Pamunkey Indians.").
282 See H.R.J. Res. 25, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1994); H.R.J. Res. 54, Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Va. 1983).
283
For information about the Mattaponi Indian Tribe, including its fish hatchery, cultural dependence on the Mattaponi River, and its fight to preserve the integrity of that
river, see Mattaponi Indian Reservation, http://www.baylink.org/Mattaponi (last visited

May 17, 2006). The hatchery supplies jobs and income for tribal members.
284 See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 634-36 (1970) (holding that the
canons of treaty construction required a finding that a tribe had title to a riverbed because
a treaty establishing the reservation promised the tribe sovereignty over its federally re-

served lands).
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this resource when it signed the Treaty at Middle Plantation with the
Virginia colonial government. 28 5 While the Treaty grants the Tribe
off-reservation fishing and hunting rights, 28 6 its dependence on the
Mattaponi River is not undermined, especially since the Treaty "intended [such off-reservation rights] to complement a life defined by
[a] permanent home[ ]."287
Should it matter, then, that the Mattaponi neither are a federally
recognized tribe nor occupy land withdrawn from the public domain
on their behalf? Royster would argue no, because the Tribe is recognized by the Commonwealth and resides on land that the state holds
"in trust" for the Tribe and its members. 28 8 Under her analogy, the
Commonwealth is under a fiduciary duty to assert Winters rights, albeit
a duty resting on state, not federal, law. The analogy should be persuasive. The state trustee, similar to the federal trustee, must ensure
that state-recognized tribes have enough water to survive.
Making Winters rights dependent on state law is not a panacea for
tribes, however. States have not been enthusiastic advocates for
tribes, 28 9 especially when tribal needs conflict with the needs of other
interested parties. 29 0 In fact, states frequently and vigorously oppose
285
See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) (pointing out that it is unlikely that tribes intended to give up their "command of the lands and waters,-command
of all their beneficial use"); see also Andrea Geiger Oakley, Note, Not on Clams Alone: Determining Indian Title to IntertidalLands-United States v. Aam, 887 F2d 190 (9th Cir. 1989), 65
WASH. L. REV. 713, 726 (1990) (noting that "[pirecedent requires that the evaluation of
dependence be expanded beyond subsistence requirements and economic considerations"
and commenting that the court in Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-CanadaEnterprises, 713
F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1983), found that "Indians depended on a disputed watercourse
not only for food and materials, but in their manner of self-identification, language, and
religious practices, to hold that a disputed riverbed was conveyed to the tribe").
286
See Treaty at Middle Plantation, art. VII, supra note 13, at 84.
287
See Oakley, supra note 285, at 727; id. nn.116 & 118 (citing cases upholding tribal
claims to submerged lands despite the tribes' use of off-reservation fishing and gathering
sites),
288
The Commonwealth of Virginia asserts fee tide to the Mattaponi's reservation as a
self-claimed postcolonial successor to the British Crown. See 1 Va. Op. Att'y Gen. 107,
108-09 (1977); see also Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 160 (1917-18) ("Mattaponi Indians of Virginia,
are wards of the State, just as the Indians under the guardianship of the United States are
wards of the nation.").
289
See Membrino, supra note 8, at 6 (noting that Wyoming responded to the Supreme
Court's warning in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545 (1983), that
"state courts adjudicating Indian water rights have a solemn obligation to follow federal
law" by "assum[ing] nearly the entire litigation burden of opposing the United States and
the Tribes" and "by challenging in its state court every aspect of the federal law of reserved
rights"); see also Capossela, supranote 152, at 144 (reporting that a tribal leader called state
jurisdiction over tribal water rights coupled with the federal policy of negotiated quantification of Indian water rights "annihilation"); Royster, supra note 5, at 99 n.227 (pointing
out that "[t]ribes fear that state economic interests in the water, the vulnerability of state
courtjudges to reelection concerns, and the actual or perceived historic bias of state courts
against Indian interests will all preclude fair adjudication of Indian reserved rights").
290
See, e.g., Letter from Frank S. Ferguson, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, to John
Dossett (June 3, 1997) (refusing to help the Mattaponi Tribe in its battle against the reser-
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such tribal initiatives by raising sovereign immunity defenses and
other state lawjurisdictional challenges, as was done repeatedly in the
Mattaponi proceedings. 29 1 As such, making successful assertions of
the Winters doctrine depend on state trustees who have shown even
less commitment to tribes than their federal counterparts is problematic to say the least. Additionally, Royster's suggestion contradicts his292
torical tribal resistance to state jurisdiction.
Furthermore, even if a state is an enthusiastic advocate for tribal
interests, far too few eastern tribes will benefit since not many reside
on state reservations. 293 Yet many eastern tribes live and depend on
water adjacent to land that is neither federal nor state in character.
Therefore, even if the problems with state governments and state law
can be overcome, Royster's argument provides no help to these tribes.
B.

Eastern Treaties Are Federal and the Rights Guaranteed
Under Them Are Matters of Federal Law

A second response to the argument that only federally recognized tribes who inhabit ceded public lands can assert Winters rights is
that the colonial treaties signed by eastern tribes have the force of
federal law. 294 As federal rights, therefore, they must be enforced re-

gardless of the tribe's status. This argument affirms that Winters rights
arise under federal law. It rejects, however, Royster's premise that
Winters rights can arise only in the case of nonfederally recognized
tribes under state law and then only in limited circumstances where a
state recognizes the tribe and acts as a trustee on its behalf. The state
is irrelevant in this new response.
voir project because doing so would favor one Commonwealth interest over another) (on
file with author).
291
Virginia has raised sovereign immunity eight times as a defense to permit challenges by the Mattaponi against the reservoir project.
292 See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973) ("'[T]he
policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the
Nation's history.'" (quoting Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945))); Membrino, supra
note 8, at 3 (listing, among arguments opponents make against state jurisdiction over reserved tribal water rights, that "federal Indian policy traditionally operates to insulate tribes
from state interference" and that "state forums are inhospitable to Indians").
293 There are approximately thirty state-recognized tribes in the eastern part of the
country, around nine of which have state-recognized reservations. See State Recognized
Tribes, http://www.accessgenealogy.com/native/staterectribes.htm (last visited May 21,
2006). Meanwhile, there are approximately 245 nonfederally recognized tribes, over half
of which also are in the eastern part of the country. See U.S. Indian Tribes, Federally Nonrecognized-Index by State, http://www.kstrom.net/isk/maps/tribesnonrec.html (last visited May 21, 2006).
294 On March 6, 2005, the Mattaponi Indian Tribe filed a certiorari petition with the
U.S. Supreme Court asking the Court to hear the question whether a colonial treaty is
enforceable as a matter of federal law under the Supremacy Clause, making many of the
same arguments as are set forth in this Article. The Tribe's petition was denied. See Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Virginia, No. 05-1141, 2006 WL 584102 (June 12, 2006).
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The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 295 the Indian
Nonintercourse Act, 296 and the primacy of the federal government in
matters involving Indians have "federalized" colonial Indian treaties.2

97

If colonial treaties are federal, rights reserved under those

treaties are enforceable as federal law, such that states cannot defeat,
298
reduce, modify, or deny them.
Colonial treaties are federal law because the Constitution
adopted "all Treaties made," including those between Indian tribes
and the British Crown, as "the supreme Law of the Land. '299 Seeing
the Constitution as "federalizing" colonial treaties would be consistent
with the then-extant international law doctrine of "universal succession," which prescribed that the United States acquired the treaty
rights and obligations of Great Britain. 30 0 The Framers clearly intended the Supremacy Clause to incorporate Indian treaties made
295

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

296

25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).

Colonial Indian treaties can also be considered federal because they support federal question jurisdiction. See Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1203-04 (10th
Cir. 2002) (holding that the district court had federal question jurisdiction to hear a staterecognized tribe's land claim, even though the act creating the reservation did not include
a specific cause of action); Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. South Carolina, 865 F.2d 1444,
1455-56 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that 1760 and 1763 treaties between the tribe and the
British Crown supported federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
298
See Indian Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000); see also California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987) ("[S]tate laws may be applied
to tribal Indians on their reservations if Congress has expressly so provided."); Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 670 (1974) ("The rudimentary
propositions that Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be extinguished only with
federal consent apply in all of the States, including the original 13... [, even though] the
United States never held fee title to the Indian lands in the original States."); Getches,
supra note 43, at 431 (arguing that application of state regulatory law that "directly conflict[s] with the tribe's ability to regulate Indian water rights [is] ... barred by the preemptive force of federal protections of tribal sovereignty"); Royster, supra note 6, at 180 n.55
(citing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Wash. Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165, 176-77 (1977), as an example
of an exception to the usual preclusion of state law on Indian reservations for the "limited
purpose of preserving the species," arising from "the Court's grant of authority to states to
regulate Indian treaty fishing rights").
299
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."); see also Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) ("The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted
and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations . . ").
300
See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544 (stating that when the United States was
formed, it acquired all the claims of Great Britain, "both territorial and political"); see also
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, 632 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 1980) ("In accord
with the Treaty of Paris, signed at the end of the Revolutionary War, the United States
succeeded to England's sovereignty."). On the topic of universal succession, see James R.
Crawford, State Succession and Relations with Federal States, 86 Am. Soc'v Ir'L
L. PROC. 1,
15-16 (1992); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 563 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library 1937) (citing Grotius' theory that "states neither lose any of their rights, nor are
discharged from any of their obligations, by a change in the form of their civil
government").
297
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during the period of the Articles of Confederation30 1 and were particularly worried about keeping peace with the Indian tribes when they
wrote the Supremacy Clause. 30 2 Indeed, on the eve of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress purposefully assured tribes that
their peace agreements with the British would be honored during and
after the Revolution.3 03 This concern for safety that motivated the authors of the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, coupled
with the Framers' respect for the principles of universal succession,
30 4
most likely extended to colonial Indian treaties.
Also, a cardinal principle of Indian law is that the federal government's role in dealing with Indian tribes is exclusive. 30 5 This principle
stems in part from the Supreme Court's aboriginal title cases, the first
of which occurred in 1823, establishing that only the federal government can extinguish Indian title to land. 30 6 Congress codified this
principle in the Indian Nonintercourse Act, which prohibits the sale
of Indian lands to any person or state without the approval of Congress. 30 7 When the Constitution vested the treaty-making power in the
federal government, it established the federal government as the pri-

301
See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1155 (2d Cir. 1988)
("[T]reaties made during the confederal period between the United States and Indian
nations are entitled to the same respect as treaties made with foreign nations[,] and ...
both equally became 'the supreme Law of the Land' by virtue of Article VI of the
Constitution.").
302

See 5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

207 (1859) (expressing concern over states' violations of treaties, "which, if not prevented,
must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars"). Furthermore, states had entered into
treaties and wars with Indian tribes notwithstanding the federal government's primary authority over relations with tribes during the confederal period. See id. at 208; see also 2
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 174 (W. Ford ed., 1905) (stating

that "securing and preserving the friendship of the Indian Nations, appears to be a subject
of the utmost moment to these colonies" and that "it becomes us to be very active and
vigilant in exerting every prudent means to strengthen and confirm the friendly disposition [of Indians] towards these colonies").
303
See A Speech to the Six ConfederationNations, Mohawks, Oneidas, Tuscaroras, Onondagas,
Cayugas, Senekas, from the Twelve United Colonies, convened in Council at Philadelphia,in 2 JouRNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 302, at 178, 182 (inviting tribal leaders to

"re-kindle the council fire, which your and our ancestors sat round in great friendship").
304
See, e.g., Treaty at Middle Plantation pmbl., supra note 13, at 82 ("I have caused to
be drawn up these ensuing Articles and Overtures, for the firm Grounding, and sure Establishment of a good and just Peace with the said Indians." (emphasis omitted)).
305
See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519 (1832) (noting that "the
whole power of regulating the intercourse with [Indians] was vested in the United States"
when the United States was formed); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759,
764 (1985) ("The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over
relations with Indian tribes.").
306
See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 586 (1823).
307
See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
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mary authority in regulating Indian affairs, 30 8 thereby ending the
30 9
states' practice of entering treaties with Indian tribes.
The federal government's plenary authority over Indian affairs
applies to agreements between foreign discovering nations and Indian
tribes. Although fee title to Indian land was first vested in the discovering European nation, and later in state sovereigns, tribal rights of
occupancy became the "exclusive province of federal law" when the
Constitution was signed.3 10 This principle is applicable in the original
thirteen states, even though the federal government never had fee title to Indian lands there. 31 1 While land rights passed from the Crown
to the thirteen original states as individual sovereigns, those states
gave up their rights over Indian lands and matters when they ratified
the Constitution in 1789. Indeed, the thirteen original states ceded
their right to control Indian affairs within their borders when they
adopted the Articles of Confederation. 3 12 Because some states ignored the central government's primary role in Indian affairs and
treaty making under the Articles, the Constitution's language centralizing authority over Indian affairs in the federal government is much
stronger. 3 13 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently recognized that during the United States' early years, its legislative power to make treaties
with the Indians rested partly upon "the Constitution's adoption of
preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal Government." 314 The federal government maintains primary authority over
3 15
Indian lands and treaties today.
308 See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 180, at 207 ("The Treaty Clause, granting exclusive authority to the national government to enter into treaties, has been a principal foundation for federal power over Indian affairs.").
309 See U.S. CONsT. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.3 (empowering
Congress to regulate commerce with Indian tribes).
310 Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974).
311 Id.
312 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl.4 (U.S. 1781) ("The United States in
Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating...
the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the states,
provided that the legislative right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or
violated ....").
313 See ELLIOT, supra note 302, at 208 (recording Madison's disapproval of states' making treaties with Indian tribes during the confederal period); see also Robert N. Clinton,
State Power over Indian Reservations:A CriticalComment on Burger Court Doctrine,26 S.D. L. REv.
434, 436 (1981) (-Madison, the prime architect of the Indian commerce clause, viewed the
provision as eliminating any claim by states to authority over Indians or their lands and
over the social, political and economic intercourse between non-Indian and Indian. Such
power was vested exclusively in the national government.").
314 United States v. Laa, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004).
315 See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 180, at 270 ("The Supreme Court has consistently followed the principle that the Constitution delegated paramount authority over Indian affairs to the federal government.").
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If federal treaties and the lands set aside for tribes under those
treaties provide the basis for the assertion of federal reserved tribal
waters rights in the West, eastern treaties, which are also federal, and
the lands reserved under them for tribes, must support these rights as
well.3 16 To find otherwise would unfairly privilege western tribes.
Such a privilege would not only defy the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, 3 17 under which all citizens are entitled to the rights and privileges of other citizens regardless of which state they live in,3 18 but also
contradict basic tenets of federal Indian law, which dictate the homogenizing effect of federal law and have given paramount control over
Indian affairs to Congress. Withholding Winters rights from eastern
tribes would also create unjustifiable and normatively unacceptable
distributive and other inequities between eastern and western tribes.
C.

Winters Rights Are Not Dependent on the Federal Status of
Either the Land to Which They Attach or of the Tribe
that Holds Them

Although Winters rights are a matter of federal law, they do not
depend on the existence of either federal land or a federally recognized tribe. Winters rights attach to reserved Indian land and are held
by the tribes that occupy that land. Also, tribal reserved water rights
predate the government's withdrawal of the land, so they are aboriginal in nature and therefore not dependent on the federal status of the
tribe or of the land that the tribe occupies.
316 Another advantage of treating colonial treaties as federal law is that courts will apply Indian canons of construction to them. These canons direct that any ambiguity in the
language of a treaty be resolved in the tribes' favor. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515,
582 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring) ("How the words of the treaty were understood by
this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of construction."); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196
(1999); McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Choctaw
Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943) (declaring that treaty language should not be construed to the prejudice of the Indians); United States v. Winans,
198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (holding that rights not specifically ceded by tribes, especially
those necessary for tribes to exercise treaty protected rights and survive on their non-ceded
land, should be considered retained by those tribes). The canons are rooted in the government's unique trust relationship with Indian tribes. See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe
of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (citing Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470
U.S. 221, 247 (1985). These interpretative rules should apply as well to resolve any ambiguities involving the extent to which the treaty reserved water rights for the tribe and the
scope of those rights. See State ex rel. Greeley v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,
712 P.2d 754, 763 (Mont. 1985) ("When adjudicating Indian reserved water rights, Montana courts must follow these principles of construction developed by the federal
judiciary.").
317
See U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 1.
318
While the Court in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884), held that Indians "were
never deemed citizens of the United States, except under explicit provisions of treaty or
statute to that effect," Congress made all Indians United States citizens in 1924. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b) (2000).
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Winters Rights Attach to Reserved Land

As noted previously, Winters.rights attach to the land and to the
tribes that hold them and do not require assertion by the federal government. While federal law protects the rights, the rights do not adhere to the federal government, and tribes can assert them
independent of the federal government.3 19 Winters rights arise from
the land's being set aside or reserved for tribes to enable them to survive. 3 20 Nothing in the Winters doctrine limits its application to federal lands, so it should apply to lands set aside by states or colonial
32 1
governments for the same purpose.
Similarly, nothing in the Winters doctrine restricts its application
to federally recognized tribes. 3 22 Eastern reservations were established for the same reasons as western reservations, so basic notions of
fairness should prevent the doctrine from being used solely to benefit
western tribes. 323 Federal recognition is a bureaucratic artifact designed to limit the number of tribes entitled to receive federal largess
like housing subsidies and health care; the definition does not constrain the existence of an Indian tribe. Many tribes refuse to seek federal recognition because of the extensive bureaucratic entanglements
involved, or because they are unable to meet the criteria of having
membership rolls or cannot show continuous government from the
319 See, e.g., Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545 (1983) (water
rights proceeding initiated by Indian tribes); see also Hundley, supra note 116, at 33-34
(arguing that the Supreme Court in Winters "implicitly" held that the Fort Belknap tribes
and the federal government had authority to reserve water when it affirmed the Ninth
Circuit holding that both parties had the right to set aside water). But see Merrill, supra
note 205, at 57-58 (pointing out that the "debate concerning who reserved the water-the
Indians or the United States" in Winters "is an important one" because if it was the federal
government, "the argument for aboriginal water rights will at best find no help in the
Winters doctrine.") Merrill himself reads Winters as "suggest[ing] that while both the Indians and the United States reserved water from the Milk River, either standing alone had
the power to do so" and that this power on the part of the Indians "to reserve necessarily
implies the existence of aboriginal rights." Id. at 59.
320 See, e.g., Helton, supra note 131, at 991 ("[R]eserved rights are based on the existence of reserved land in need of water.").
321
See Royster, supra note 6, at 191 (noting that neither of two rationales for reserved
tribal water rights-allowing "tribes to continue pre-existing or aboriginal practices, particularly those food-gathering practices essential to the tribe" and fulfilling "the purposes for
which the reservation was created"-"is confined to a line west of the 100th meridian").
322
Indeed, the Court has recognized congressional preeminence even when the tribe
had received state citizenship and was no longer under the federal government's supervision. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 652-54 (1978). The Court has also held that
treaty rights survive termination of federal status. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968).
323
See Royster, supra note 6, at 191 (comparing the Chippewa of the western Great
Lakes, who "reserved to themselves the right to continue to hunt and gather the wild rice,
even in their ceded territory," to the Pacific Northwest tribes, who "reserved to themselves
the right to continue to fish at their usual and accustomed places" (citations omitted)).
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time of first contact with non-Indians. Other tribes do not want to
subject themselves to government oversight or control.
2.

Aboriginal Use Rights Provide a Separate Basisfor Winters Rights

Aboriginal rights are "qualitatively different" from Winters
rights. 3 24 Aboriginal water rights are broader than reserved tribal

water rights because they can support traditional, customary activities
and are not restricted by the "purposes" of the reservation. 325 Since
aboriginal rights attach to a tribe's ancestral lands, not the reservation, they predate Winters rights. 3 2 6 Therefore, aboriginal water rights
will always be senior to other competing uses. 3 27 Aboriginal rights attaching to ancestral lands means their existence is independent of
federal or state laws, including treaties, regardless of whether the federal government has subsequently reserved those lands or federally
recognized the tribe. 328 Additionally, the Winters doctrine puts Indian
water rights under the control of the federal government, which has
done little to protect tribal reserved water rights because of the government's dominant policy goal of developing water resources for
non-Indian uses. 329 Since aboriginal water rights do not depend on a
324
Ross, supra note 124, at 200. See generally Merrill, supra note 205, at 46 (noting that
"aboriginal rights were judicially decreed in a 1935 Arizona case and exist as pueblo water

rights in California and New Mexico").
325
Royster, supra note 6, at 176-77.
326
See id. at 177. Merrill suggests that "ina more subtle sense," aboriginal fights "offer" Indians something the Winters doctrine does not, as they "rest on Indian history," unlike Winters, which rests on "white man's history." Merrill, supra note 205, at 70. As the
assertion of aboriginal water rights could theoretically "disrupt" the expectations of other
holders of water rights, in part because of "[a] n immemorial priority date," Merrill suggests
this result could be avoided if the federal government "assert[ed] ownership of those rights
as guardian and trustee on behalf of the Indians." Id. at 67-68. He notes that "[w] hile such
a result may appear anomalous to the very concept of an aboriginal right, federal guardianship over Indian property is deeply rooted in the nation's history." Id. at 68. As to whether
pueblo water rights are Winters rights, see id. at 63-64 (arguing that pueblo water rights are
not Winters rights since pueblo lands "never have been a part of the federal public domain
but always have been Indian lands," and suggesting that the Court either "extend Winters to
the pueblos and apply the reserved rights doctrine to define their water rights" or "recognize the unique history of the pueblos and accord them a new species of water right which
is truly aboriginal").
327
This difference has primary significance in a prior appropriation jurisdiction, as
seniority is of limited relevance in a common law riparian system. See generally Colorado v.
New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 179 n.4 (1982) (describing the rule of priority as a feature that
distinguishes the prior appropriation and riparian doctrines). It may also be important in
a regulated riparian system, if prior uses are grandfathered. See Choe, supra note 2, at 1912
(asserting that "even in those cases where permits are required [for the use of water],
agencies tend to favor existing or grandfathered uses").
328
See Merrill, supra note 205, at 47 (stating that "Indians do not base their aboriginal
claims on European grants. Indian rights stem from the tribes' original occupation and
dominion over the land and water for centuries before the Europeans arrived").
329
See supra Part II.A; see also Ross, supra note 124, at 200 (noting that "[a]t no point
did the United States even make a pretense of purchasing or negotiating Indian water
rights").
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federal reservation of land or on a federal trust relationship, the develon the federal government
opment of those rights does not depend
0
33
and is thus not subject to its control.

Eastern tribes, like many western tribes, possess aboriginal
rights.

331

These rights entitle them to hunt, fish, and gather on their

ancestral lands unless these rights have been specifically abrogated by
a treaty or otherwise eliminated by Congress. 332 When tribes ceded
their land to settlers, they did not cede the aboriginal rights that attached to the land the tribes retained, including the right to sufficient
water to support their activities. 33 3 Thus, treaties do not create aboriginal rights; treaties generally "confirmed the continued existence of
these rights. ''33 4 So long as these tribes continue to occupy their traditional homelands, which many eastern tribes such as the Mattaponi
336
do, 335 aboriginal rights continue in force.

330 State courts may, however, have jurisdiction over aboriginal water rights. See Merrill, supra note 205, at 65-66 (asserting that the combination of the McCarran Amendment
and the Supreme Court's expansion of state court jurisdiction over Winters claims "suggest
state courts do have jurisdiction over aboriginal rights"). Merrill also suggests that "aboriginal water rights may be a creature of state law," thus making the denial of state court
jurisdiction "an absurd result." Id. at 66. But see Royster, supra note 6, at 177 n.34 (concluding that, regardless of whether tribes or the United States reserved water rights in
Winters, such reserved rights are "questions of federal law" because they "are either federally created or federally protected and guaranteed"). Placing the prosecution of aboriginal
water rights in state court raises the previously mentioned problem of the hostility of state
proceedings toward tribal claims of special rights. See supra note 159 and accompanying
text.
331
See Merrill, supra note 205, at 52 n.29 (observing that "a literal reading of Winters v.
United States . . . suggests that Indian reserved and aboriginal water rights often may be
the same").
332 See State ex rel. Greeley v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754-63
(Mont. 1985) (noting that treaties do not implicitly diminish aboriginal holdings and that
uninterupted use and occupation of land can create aboriginal title) (citing United States
v. Klamath Indians, 304 U.S. 119, 122-23 (1938)); United States v. Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40,
46 (1946) (stating that only the United States can extinguish aboriginal title); United
States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353-54 (1941) (holding that an Indian
reservation will be defined to protect any pre-existing possessory rights of the Indians unless a contrary intent clearly appears in the document or statute that created the
reservation).
333 See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 198 (1999) (observing that when a
treaty and the record of its negotiation were silent regarding usufructuary rights in ceded
land, it was "difficult to believe" tribes would have agreed to relinquish those rights "without at least a passing word about their relinquishment"); Royster, supra note 6, at 176
(commenting that "tribes would not have bargained to continue pre-existing or aboriginal
food practices without an understanding that the water necessary to allow those practices
would be available" (citation omitted)).
334 Adair, 723 F.2d at 1414.
335 See ROUNrREE, supra note 12, at 163-64. The modern day Mattaponi reservation
encompasses what remains of the Tribe's original treaty-protected land holdings. See id..
336 See, e.g., Adair, 723 F.2d at 1413.
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Finding that Winters affirms the existence of aboriginal-based
water rights would particularly help eastern tribes 33 7 because these
rights would provide tribes in the east with a separate basis for assertion of Winters rights. 3 38 More importantly, if Winters affirms the exis-

tence of aboriginal rights, then the nature of these rights eliminates
the barriers and problems discussed in this Article, including the need
for federal land or federal recognition. Tribes relying on their aboriginal, water-based uses should have greater flexibility using that water
than they would under a strict application of the Winters doctrine.
They should also be entitled to more water, and in riparian jurisdictions, they should benefit from being the more senior riparians, as
new riparians must demonstrate that their uses will not interfere with
existing uses. Basing a Winters claim on aboriginal use rights has not
been tested in court, however, and the relationship between the Winters doctrine and aboriginal water rights is the subject of debate.
For these reasons, eastern tribes could claim reserved water
rights, a claim which equitable and utilitarian principles encourage
them to make. Therefore, despite the limitations of the Winters doctrine, it does offer eastern tribes the best means of claiming sufficient
water to maintain their traditional ways.
CONCLUSION

No court has ever held that an eastern tribe cannot assert a Winters right to the water that flows passed its reservation, nor should a
court ever do so. Although the doctrine arose in a prior appropriation jurisdiction and has been applied exclusively in western states,
nothing in the original decision or the doctrine's origins indicates
that it should be limited to such contexts. The doctrine's use in dual337
Since Winters rights are difficult for tribes to obtain, see supra note 152 and accompanying text, an alternative basis for a reserved water right is of interest to all tribes.
338 See Merrill, supra note 205, at 59 (pointing out that those tribes whose reservations
are "located in whole or in part on their ancestral lands may find support in Winters for
their claims to aboriginal rights"). Any tribe relying on aboriginal use rights will still have
to establish their existence, which may be difficult because of the indeterminacy of the
historical record. See, e.g., New Mexico Prods. Co. v. New Mexico Power Co., 77 P.2d 634,
639 (N.M. 1937) (finding that no pueblo existed, and consequently holding that there was
no pueblo water right). However, when a treaty confirms aboriginal use rights, any ambiguity about such rights should be resolved in the tribe's favor under the Indian canons of
construction. See supra note 316. See also Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 200 (recognizing that
Chippewa tribe's treaty protected off-reservation aboriginal hunting and fishing rights);
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 (1905) (allowing a tribe to cross private property to get to its usual and accustomed fishing spots because it had retained its off-reservation fishing rights in a treaty with the federal government); State v. Miller, 689 P.2d 81,
84-85 (Wash. 1984) (applying Indian canons and their policy justifications in recognizing
fishing and hunting rights embodied in a federal Indian treaty). The same intent should
be inferred from eastern treaties, since they contain similar language. See, e.g., Treaty at
Middle Plantation, arts. III, IV, VII, supra note 13, at 83-84.
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system jurisdictions belies any such conclusion. Additionally, the inherent flexibility of common law riparianism and the evolution of regulated riparianism in the east facilitate the incorporation of Winters
rights into those systems. In fact, Winters may fit better in the east than
in the west, where the doctrine is an anomaly under the prior appropriation doctrine.
Although most eastern tribes are not federally recognized and do
not live on withdrawn federal lands, the doctrine should still apply to
the tribes because it can be used under state law. Alternatively, the
Winters doctrine recognizes aboriginal rights, which predate the formation of the United States and do not depend on federal law, including treaties, for their existence. Even if the doctrine does depend on
federal law for its existence, eastern tribes with colonial treaties can
assert Winters rights because the treaties and the rights they guarantee
are federal law under the Constitution, the Indian Nonintercourse
Act, and the federal government's dominant role in matters affecting
Indian tribes.
Thus, there are no insurmountable legal barriers to the assertion
of Winters rights in the east. Indeed, there are compelling normative
and practical reasons why eastern tribes should seek their use.

